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This study considers the impact of community-level inequality of income and education on
the ways individuals participate in local government and community development activities.
It adapts the standard identity-augmented utility model to demonstrate that, given the choice
to participate or not to participate, increases in inequality can decrease overall group partic-
ipation, and an individual’s distance from the characteristics of an ideal community member
can also decrease the benefits and likelihood of participation. The theory predicts, however,
that increasing the responsiveness of civic bodies to input from citizens can mitigate the neg-
ative effects of inequality. Original survey data from a stratified random sample of over 680
Missoula households are then analyzed to test the implications of the theory. In Missoula,
people have 3 participation options: not participating at all, participating alone (by writing
letters or watching meetings on television), or participating in person. A multinomial logit
model to estimate the probability of choosing a certain outcome shows that people living in
neighborhoods characterized by high inequality are less likely to drop out, but more likely to
participate alone. This effect is most pronounced under high educational inequality.
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Chapter 1
Introduction
In recent years, a belief has taken hold that developing and industrialized countries, alike, can
benefit from encouraging widespread participation of citizens in the planning and execution
of public projects. The idea is that greater participation leads to more expression of political
voice, which in turn leads to greater information sharing. This increased information about
constituent needs translates into more efficient targeting of political and social benefits. Fur-
thermore, when more people are involved in determining the shape of their civic environment,
a sense of ownership will provide greater incentive for all citizens to ensure a healthier civic
climate, in general, and successful project outcomes, in particular.
As the two predominant political parties in the United States enthusiastically encourage the
vitality of myriad grassroots organizations, and as the World Bank works with the government
of Afghanistan on a National Solidarity Program to generate employment and rehabilitate ru-
ral infrastructure through a participatory approach World Bank (2007), some social scientists
note that participatory development schemes can lead to undesirable outcomes unless certain
specific conditions are met. Similar to the risk of asymmetric capture of benefits by the lo-
cal elite associated with fiscal decentralization, participatory development schemes frequently
1
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open a path for elite classes to consolidate power and wealth at the expense of the poor and
underprivileged (Platteau and Abraham, 2002). In industrialized democracies, like the U.S.,
the problem stemming from unbalanced political participation may not be capture of govern-
ment funds and services or consolidation of tangible power, but rather the transfer to policy
makers of misrepresentative information about citizen preferences and needs.
It is important to understand, therefore, what factors determine whether or not a person will
participate in civic activities. Conventional wisdom suggests that those enjoying a relatively
high socioeconomic status are the ones who are most involved in both local and national
politics throughout the world. Economists and other social scientists have more recently
begun to look not only at how one’s relative socioeconomic position influences her participation
patterns, but also how the shape of the distribution of income and wealth in her community
play a direct role. Although initial studies suggest that community-level heterogeneity, like
income inequality, negatively influences the likelihood that someone will participate in local
government (e.g., Alesina and La Ferrara (2000) and La Ferrara (2002)), others suggest that
inequality increases participation (Rubenson, 2005). The results are far from definitive, and
La Ferrara (2002) writes that relatively little work has been done on the effect of inequality
on participation.
This thesis makes four main contributions to this discussion. First, it adapts the standard
identity-augmented utility model, developed by Akerlof and Kranton (2000, 2002, 2005), to
explain how heterogeneity influences political participation. In the model, in addition to tradi-
tional economic costs and benefits related to participation, citizens earn “identity benefits”—
the good feelings that come from fitting in with and cooperating with a group—and suffer
“identity costs” proportional to the extent to which they do not fit in with the group. The
implications of the model are that increased heterogeneity in a community decreases overall
participation from both sides of the distribution, and those with greater “identity costs” are
less likely to participate. These effects can be mitigated, however, by increasing the respon-
siveness of civic bodies to constituents’ political voice.
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A second general contribution of this thesis is the addition to the small but growing body of
empirical evidence on the effect of inequality on participation, by generating and analyzing a
new survey data set collected during the second half of 2006 from the small city of Missoula,
Montana in the Rocky Mountain West. The 3rd and 4th major contributions follow from the
structure of Missoula’s local civic system. To the best of our knowledge, all the research into
how heterogeneity influences political participation allows for only two options: to participate
or to drop out. In Missoula, however, the additional option of solitary participation by
watching recordings or reading transcripts of meetings, or by contacting public officials or
newspaper editors illuminates how inequality effects participation in a more dynamic way
that can explain some of the previous empirical ambiguities described above. On the one
hand, inequality may encourage participation, since it is often accompanied by misaligned
preferences over which opposed constituents would have more incentive to fight.1 On the other
hand, people tend to be adverse to interactions with people whom they see as fundamentally
different from themselves. As heterogeneity or inequality increase, then, participation would
be expected to decrease. If given only the choice to participate or not to participate, a negative
relationship between inequality and participation makes some sense. But if given the option
of participating alone, inequality may lead to greater overall participation, but less group-
based participation. Finally, previous studies appear only to consider the effects of wealth
or income inequality; this thesis also contributes by being among the first to examine the
effect of educational inequality on participation. In Missoula, where wages for highly skilled
workers are disproportionately depressed and the presence of a university can frequently act
as a divisive force between those with more or less education, educational inequality has a
stronger impact on participation than income inequality.
The remainder of this thesis proceeds as follows: Chapter 2 reviews the existing literature on
the effect of participation on the functions of government, the determinants of participation,
and the record of inequality in the U.S. and in Montana since the middle of the 20th century.
1A less pessimistic view also suggests that citizens would be aware of pervasive inequality, would interpret
it as an injustice, and would take a more active role in civic life to mollify that injustice.
CHAPTER 1. INTRODUCTION 4
Chapter 3 develops the theoretical model to be tested. Chapter 4 discusses the data set used
in the analysis, Chapter 5 develops the empirical strategy and gives the results, and Chapter 6
offers concluding remarks and suggestions for future research.
Chapter 2
Literature Review
2.1 Participation and Outcomes
This study relies on the assumption that communities enjoy more efficient outcomes when
fully representative segments of the population participate in civic enterprises. While this
assumption is not universally accepted, the hypothesis that a link exists between participa-
tion and positive political outcomes has merit. More importantly, it is already being applied
in both the developing world, where so much enthusiasm accompanies decentralization and
“participatory development,” as well as in industrialized democracies, where town hall meet-
ings are popular fora for national policy makers and presidential hopefuls to hear input from
individual citizens. The rationale is that fully representative participation increases informa-
tion and equips policy-makers to better determine the needs of constituents. In representative
democracies, this helps politicians more efficiently target programs to benefit citizens. In the
context of development projects, when intended beneficiaries actively participate in planning
and execution, they have the opportunity to provide unique insight into the problem-at-hand.
This increases the likelihood of successful project outcomes by more accurately identifying
5
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strategies that will fulfill practical necessities and avoiding the unintended consequences typ-
ically associated with externally imposed projects.
Theoretical support for participatory development schemes has a long and well-developed tra-
dition. It is closely related to theories of fiscal and institutional decentralization developed by
Oates (1972, 1999, 2005) and Tiebout (1956). As noted above, the force of the argument for de-
centralized governance (and therefore increased local participation) is that information about
constituents’ needs will be more accurate and less costly to obtain as those constituents become
more involved in decision-making. Chambers (1983) and Kleymeyer (1992) also emphasize
the value of empowerment and ownership that citizens—particularly the poor—develop when
they have a role in directing development projects. Stiglitz (2002) argues that insofar as de-
velopment is a process by which attitudes toward social and technological change grow more
positive, participation of marginalized groups is a necessary condition for success.
Empirical evidence supporting a positive relationship between participation and project out-
comes in a development context is wide and growing. Putnam et al. (1993, 1995, 2001)
provided early evidence of a causal relationship between social capital, participation, and pos-
itive societal outcomes ranging from public goods provision to health and happiness. More
specifically, Isham et al. (1995) show that beneficiary participation causes significantly better
development project outcomes, and Isham and Kahkonen (2002) show this to be true with
regard to community-based water projects in Java. Using survey data from southern India,
Besley et al. (2005) show that constituents who participate in village level meetings called
Gram Sambhas are more likely to benefit from the social programs advanced during those
meetings. In particular, members of disadvantaged social groups were more likely to receive
social welfare in villages where participation by those groups was high. Likewise, Chattopad-
hyay and Duflo (2004) use survey data from a randomized policy experiment in India to show
that villages in which women have a mandated political voice also provide public goods that
are more relevant to the needs of women.
2.1. PARTICIPATION AND OUTCOMES 7
Few, if any, of these aforementioned researchers would claim that participation is a panacea
for development objectives, and many point out that participatory development strategies can
have ambiguous outcomes depending on existing conditions within communities. In a review
of both economic and anthropological arguments on community-based development, Mansuri
and Rao (2004) conclude that participatory development schemes are naively overused and
that such projects are best undertaken in a context-specific manner. Platteau and Abraham
(2002) argue that such development schemes can actually exacerbate existing community
imperfections like economic and political inequality when such imperfections already exist.
They assert that if local leaders hold their positions by virtue of age and lineage, those leaders
will feel threatened by the increasing political power and improved socioeconomic position of
non-elites that are the goals of most development schemes. In those cases, it is likely that
local elites will rebel and protect their positions by capturing the intended benefits of the
poorer members of the community.
There is also empirical evidence showing participation to have negative or ambiguous effects
on political outcomes. Platteau and Abraham (2002) describe many cases in which political
decentralization either fails in non-egalitarian communities or succeeds only by virtue of a cen-
tral government careful not to devolve too much power too quickly, and other reviewers come
to similar conclusions (Conning and Kevane, 2002; Mansuri and Rao, 2004; Cleaver, 2005).
Platteau and Strzalecki (2004) also show how strongly participants’ expectations about the
success or failure of projects can influence their outcomes. In this study of Senegalese fish-
ing villages, projects failed when participants were pessimistic after some earlier attempt at
cooperation broke down. Furthermore, Gugerty and Kremer (2000) show that the cost of
encouraging participation can be greater than the benefits, as was the case in a Kenyan agri-
cultural development project. In reality, it is likely that participatory development schemes
have ambiguous effects depending on the institutional and cultural conditions of the rele-
vant populations (Conning and Kevane, 2002; Platteau and Abraham, 2002; Platteau and
Strzalecki, 2004; Mansuri and Rao, 2004).
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This discussion is also relevant in the context of the industrialized world, although it is gen-
erally reframed as a question of whether authoritarian or democratic governance is more
conducive to growth. Historically, it was popular to view democracy and growth as a trade off
scenario, and this was mostly due to the rapid expansion of the Soviet Union following World
War II (Bhagwati, 2002; Stiglitz, 2002). Following the collapse of the USSR, however, this
view fell out of favor. More recently, the difficulties of eastern Europe’s transition economies
and the success of east Asian countries like Singapore, South Korea, Taiwan, and China have
been cited as evidence for a positive relationship between “soft authoritarianism” and growth
(Bhagwati, 2002; Yew, 1998). Bhagwati (2002) argues, however, that incentives for develop-
ment and growth, “not the ability to force the pace through Draconian state action” (153), are
responsible for economic achievement. Bhagwati further asserts that these incentives arise or-
ganically in democratic countries. Insofar as democratized and localized rule promote greater
accountability and less corruption among political leaders, the quality of political institutions
can increase (Smoke, 2001), and Rivera-Batiz (2002) argues that economic growth is more
likely by means of these improved institutions. Kauper (2007) similarly demonstrates that
high-quality institutions (i.e., low levels of corruption) lead to greater efficiency and faster
growth.
2.2 Determinants of Participation
Putting aside for the moment the question of how participation affects governance and devel-
opment, it is instructive to review the literature considering the determinants of civic partic-
ipation. Toward this end, it is also useful to examine how social scientists have explained the
motives for cooperation and group formation. Section 2.2.1 considers theories on collective
action at the aggregate-level, and section 2.2.2 reviews how individuals’ economic resources
and social contexts can explain individual participation decisions.
2.2. DETERMINANTS OF PARTICIPATION 9
2.2.1 Collective Action
Economic theories explaining the collective action of a group to solve market-failures (e.g.,
those related to public goods and common property resources) rely heavily on Olson (1965).
Olson argues that groups form to achieve a communal task under one of two sufficient condi-
tions: either the group must be small and homogenous, or it must have a means to dissuade
free-riding. The first condition essentially states that transaction costs associated with coor-
dination must be low. That is, groups must be small enough to easily communicate and must
feature largely homogenous interests between members (1965, 1993). As group size or the
diversity of interests within the group increase, it becomes proportionally harder to promote
cooperative action until, eventually, the potential for that action dissolves. This accords with
the analysis of Coase, who argues that modest transaction costs (litigation or travel costs, for
example) can derail cooperation and prevent independent parties from reaching an efficient
outcome without external mediation. Furthermore, Coase maintains, as the number of par-
ties negotiating increases, the potential for an efficient outcome diminishes (1960). For Olson,
when group size increases, not only does coordination become more problematic, but so too
does the free-rider problem. If groups are prohibitively large, “selective incentives”, mecha-
nisms that reward those who pull their own weight and punish those who would free-ride on
others’ effort, must be in place.1 Development and enforcement costs of selective incentives
are frequently high, which means the cost of membership to groups will also be high. The ben-
efits of collective action in large populations are, therefore, “. . . less often available to potential
entrants or those at the lower levels of the social order . . . ” (Olson, 1993, p. 474). Therefore,
whether the group is small with homogenous preferences or large and exclusive, heterogene-
ity impedes collective action (Olson, 1965; 1993). Similar to Olson’s conclusions, Bardhan,
Ghatak, and Karaivanov (2006a) assert that within-group homogeneity (wealth-equality, in
particular) is always most conducive to collective action, but heterogeneity between groups
1Olson concludes that in societies with wide distributions of wealth and no selective incentives, those on the
high end of the distribution would provide public goods while those on the low end would take advantage of
those goods by free-riding. This inefficient outcome would, in the end, prevent those goods from being provided
(1965, 1993).
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actually creates an atmosphere conducive to competition and economic expansion (2006a,
2006b). Oliver (1999) supports this using the 1990 Citizen Participation Survey. Bardhan
(2001) points out that under conditions of extreme inequality within-groups, asymmetric bar-
gaining power between community members can easily lead to breakdowns in coordination.
Collective action, he argues, can suffer from within-group inequality.
On the other hand, Baland and Platteau theorize that wealth inequality has no effect (or, at
least, a non-measurable effect) on civic participation (1997, 1998, 1999), and Varughese and
Ostrom (2001) confirm this in their study of Nepalese forest user groups, where heterogeneity
is not a strong predictor of collective action. Other field-based and experimental empirical
studies suggest that the potential for collective action under conditions of heterogeneity and
wealth-inequality is just ambiguous. Poteete and Ostrom (2004), for example, use interna-
tional data on forestry management to show that heterogeneity has ambiguous effects on the
prospects of collective action, and Baland and Platteau (1999) reach similar conclusions in
their review. Finally, Rubenson (2005) shows that increases in heterogeneity in American
cities lead to more conflicts over resources and mobilize citizen participation. Clearly, col-
lective action theory lacks the power to conclusively explain what causes individuals within
communities to work together toward a common goal. The lack of consensus regarding the
effect of heterogeneity on collective action may be due in part to the fact that collective action
focuses on the aggregated behavior of many individuals, rather than on the decision process
of individuals.
2.2.2 The Individual Participation Decision
Observations of a group’s behavior seldom reveal the specific motivation for that behavior,
since the observer is really witnessing the agglomerated behavior of many individuals, each
responding to his or her own set of incentives. Social scientists stand to gain insight, then,
by looking beyond how a community’s characteristics influence collective action and toward
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the way individual- and community-characteristics work together to influence a person’s ac-
tion. Two broad strategies for such an analysis appear in the existing literature on political
participation. The first, more traditional, method considers how an individual’s more-or-less
measurable resources (such as time, money, and education) influence the level of utility he or
she will get from participating. That utility, ultimately, determines the participation decision.
These models, however, neglect to consider the context in which those resources influence
behavior. That is, the resource-based models, in trying to predict social behavior, treat peo-
ple as though they were perfectly isolated. The second method for modeling an individual’s
social behavior addresses the issues related to purely resource-based models and describes how
community characteristics (such as the level of wealth- and educational-inequality) and the
individual’s personal characteristics work together to instigate behavior. These models begin
with standard utility theory and augment it to reflect the way social context frames emotion,
identity, perception, and finally action.
Socioeconomic Status and Resource-Based Models of Political Participation
Socioeconomic status (SES) models of political participation assume that an individual’s so-
cioeconomic characteristics determine whether or not he or she will participate in political
and civic activity. Factors such as income, education, and occupation, therefore, are predic-
tors for engagement, such that people with higher socioeconomic status (i.e., more income
and education, and better jobs) are more likely to participate (Verba et al., 2004; Brady,
2004). The SES model, however, is primarily descriptive and has little to say about how these
socioeconomic indicators influence behavior. Brady, Verba, and Schlozman (1995) provide a
nuanced variation. In this resource-based model, individuals gain utility from participating,
and they allocate their time toward participation until the costs associated with it outweigh
the benefits. Socioeconomic status implies a set of resources that determine the relative size
of the costs of participation (Brady et al., 1995). Resources like money, educational attain-
ment, and time are common explanatory factors in these models. Those with more free time,
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for example, are more likely to participate since their opportunity cost of doing so is lower
(and, by extension, the utility gained from participating is higher). In many ways, then, these
models resemble the household production model developed Becker (1965) or the theory of
consumption pioneered by Lancaster (1966).
Augmented-Utility-Based Models of Political Participation
Many social scientists criticize SES and resource-based models because of their failure to ac-
count for the way societal factors interact with individual characteristics to direct behavior
(Casta and Kahn, 2003; Huckfeldt, 1979; Rotolo, 2000; Scheufele et al., 2004). The intu-
ition behind this criticism is fairly clear. Human beings are not insular. Instead, people’s
decisions depend on unique characteristics, the environment in which the decisions are made,
and the interplay between the two. Most treatments of the relationship between societal
characteristics and individual behavior, referred to here as “augmented-utility models”, focus
on the psychological effect community-level heterogeneity has on individuals’ willingness to
join groups or volunteer. Most of these theories, like much of the work on collective action
discussed above, conclude that heterogeneity has a negative influence on participation (e.g.,
La Ferrara (2002)). Although augmented-utility models reach conclusions similar to collective
action models regarding community heterogeneity and civic participation, the basic mechan-
ics whereby they do so differ dramatically. In collective action models, the group as a whole
suffers high transaction costs due to community heterogeneity; in augmented-utility models,
the individual experiences psychological disutility, or cognitive dissonance, from interacting
with heterogeneous groups.
Rotolo (2000) begins with a sociological principle that people are inherently homophilous;
that is, they have a propensity to associate with those whom they see as similar to them-
selves. Networks between members of a community, then, tend to be based on homophilous
social contacts. As communities become more heterogeneous, therefore, the number of po-
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tential homophilous ties decreases, which accordingly decreases civic engagement within that
community. Similarly, Alesina and La Ferrara (2000) build a model for participation in het-
erogeneous communities that depends on the assumption that people prefer to interact in
groups composed of members of their own racial type. The formal model stipulates that an
individual’s utility from participating is a function of that person’s distance from the group
headquarters, the proportion of the population that is another racial type, and the individ-
ual’s personal aversion to interacting with people who are racially different (α). In particular,
utility decreases as α increases or the population of other racial types increase. As racial
fragmentation increases, therefore, the utility associated with participating decreases until
individuals will choose to drop out. In the empirical part of the study, Alesina and La Ferrara
find supporting evidence that heterogeneous communities have lower overall participation,
and those who do not participate have the strongest views against racial-mixing. Addition-
ally, they find added instances of heterogeneity like income-inequality exacerbate the negative
pressure of racial fragmentation on participation (2000).
The explanations of Rotolo (2000) as well as Alesina and La Ferrara (2000) take preferences
for homophilous interaction or aversion to heterogeneous interaction as exogenously deter-
mined and leave the question of what makes a person more or less adverse to heterogeneous
interaction largely unanswered. Following Putnam (1995), social scientists have increasingly
looked to the concept of trust. Here, trust underlies Alesina and La Ferrara’s aversion fac-
tor or Rotolo’s preference for homophily. What is attractive about this approach is that the
degree to which a person is trusting of others depends in large part on his or her cultural,
religious, and economic environment. In a later article, Alesina and La Ferrara (2002) consider
the determinants of trust and find that composition of one’s community, including racial and
income heterogeneity, has a significant and profound effect on trust. Thus Alesina and La Fer-
rara (2002) illuminate their previous study by showing how racial fragmentation, for example,
decreases a person’s overall trust in others, decreases his or her specific trust for members
of other racial groups, which decreases the likelihood that that person will participate in
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civic activities. More specifically, Uslaner and Brown (2005) argue that regularly witnessing
economic inequality leads one to develop a generally pessimistic world-view characterized by
distrust not only of other people but also of the possibility of a positive future. Trust, then,
has its largest negative effect on one’s participation in community building, volunteering, and
charitable giving.
Finally, Akerlof and Kranton (2000, 2002, 2005) offer a compelling model for human behavior
that incorporates the sociological concept of identity into traditional utility analysis. The
identity-augmented utility model specifies that individuals’ utility depends on the typical set
of independent variables (income, cost, etc.) and the good (or bad) feelings that come from
doing things that harmonize (or clash) with one’s sense of identity as an individual and mem-
ber of a group. To illustrate, consider the two universal and abstract social categories, “man”
and “woman”, each of which implies an ideal set of physical attributes and prescribed be-
havior. Each member of a population is assigned to a gender category. People get identity
payoffs when they adhere to their gender ideals, and they experience anxiety or discomfort as
their characteristics diverge from that ideal. While the degree to which a person’s physical
attributes correspond to the ideal is (for the most part) exogenous, she or he can adapt behav-
ior to fit the gender-specific prescriptions to maximize identity payoffs (Akerlof and Kranton,
2000). If the ideal attributes and behavior of gender categories or other groups depend on
societal forces, it becomes clear how an individual maximizes utility by shaping behavior to
match the behavior of the ideal member of his or her group. Akerlof and Kranton apply this
basic analysis to explain what would otherwise be described as maladaptive behavior, gender
discrimination in the labor market, poverty and exclusion, and household division of labor
(2000). They also apply this analysis to explain effort in the workplace (2005) and in schools
(2002). In the latter, the authors find that as the degree of social difference—heterogeneity—
among a student population increases, so too does the number of groups with which students
can identify. In turn, the likelihood that the students would identify with the school decreases,
and with it the likelihood that students put high levels of effort into school-related activities.
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However, these effects can be augmented by institutional policies aimed to help students iden-
tify with the school (Akerlof and Kranton, 2002).2 The identity-augmented utility model is
relevant to the previous discussion, therefore, because it can shed light on how heterogeneity
like income inequality or racial fragmentation in a community can influence an individual’s
response to that inequality through patterns of participation.
This study will be among the first to adapt the Akerlof and Kranton model of identity-
augmented utility to explain how inequality influences patterns of political participation.
Chapter 3 carries this out formally, and Chapter 5 tests whether the model applies to neigh-
borhoods within an American city in the Rocky-Mountain west. First, though, it will be
helpful to review patterns of inequality with the United States, in general, and the west, in
particular.
2.3 Inequality in the US and the West
Nearly all of the studies surveyed above theorize or show empirically that inequality has
some effect on participation. Whether that effect is positive or negative, the question of
how inequality influences participation should be important to communities and countries
that exhibit both changing distributions of income or wealth and a desire to promote citizen
participation. During the last four decades, inequality has increased in the United States
(Jones Jr. and Weinberg, 2000; Plotnick et al., 1998; Weinberg, 1996), where participatory
democracy is fundamental to the political and social culture. So the question of how those
changes in inequality affect the democratic process is urgent. Furthermore, if the health of
US federalism depends on vibrant local governments, it is important to study how localized
inequality affects localized participation. This section reviews some of the broad body of
literature that establishes and explains the phenomenon of increasing income inequality in the
2Such policies might involve including students in curriculum building, developing athletic programs, and
holding school-spirit rallies. Mandatory school uniforms may also be helpful for reducing the degree of perceived
social difference in the student population.
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US. Additionally, it reviews the evidence of a changing distribution of income and increasing
inequality in Montana, from where the survey data for the empirical analysis come.
There is little debate about the way income inequality changed in the United States throughout
the 20th century. Initially, inequality was relatively high until it dropped precipitously after
World War II. Then, it remained fairly stable to the 1970s, when inequality began to rise again.
This pattern holds under a wide variety of measurements (Rodŕıguez et al., 2002), including
the Gini index (e.g., Jones Jr. and Weinberg, 2000; Nielsen and Alderson, 1997), income-share
ratios (e.g., Piketty and Saez, 2003; Gottschalk and Danziger, 2005), or generalized entropy
indices (Galbraith and Hale, 2006a, for example). More and more, the topic of increasing
income inequality is earning attention from the popular press (Johnston, 2007) and politicians
at the highest level (Abramowitz and Montgomery, 2007). Despite the fact that there is not
a clear consensus on the causes of the growing economic disparity in the U.S.3, it is clear that
inequality is growing throughout the nation.
Income inequality has also risen in Montana since the 1970s (Galbraith and Hale, 2006b;
Partridge et al., 1998; Silva and Leichenko, 2003), although the rate at which it has risen over
that time was less than the national average (Barrett, 1999; Partridge et al., 1998). As is the
case with changes in levels of national inequality, no explicit consensus on the causes of income
inequality in Montana exists. Partridge et al. (1998) attribute variations in intrastate income
inequality to a combination of state-wide institutional efforts toward economic development
as well as cultural and religious pressures. Barrett (1999) finds that wages at the upper tail
of the income distribution grew more slowly and those at the lower end declined more slowly
than throughout the rest of the country, which explains why income inequality increased at
slower rate than the rest of the U.S.. Figure 2.1 shows the time series of Montana’s Gini index
between 1969 and 2004.
3Researchers involved in the debate seem to fall into two broad camps: those who believe U.S. inequality
is due to structural changes in economic and familial institutions, and those who believe the observed increase
is actually a cyclical phenomenon that will inevitably be followed by a plateau and subsequent decrease in
inequality. For examples of the former group, see Daly and Valletta (2000) or Autor et al. (2005). For the
latter, see the famous article by Kuznets (1955), Nielsen and Alderson (1997), or Reynolds (2007).
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Figure 2.1: Time series of Montana’s Gini index between 1969 and 2004
2.4 Summary
This chapter began by reviewing the predominant literature on the effect of citizen engage-
ment on the outcomes of political and developmental projects. While participation is by no
means a panacea for the world’s political, social, and economic challenges, there is good reason
to believe that it can improve information sharing and coordination, given the proper insti-
tutional and social context. Namely, the literature points toward widespread participation
having positive consequences in communities where inequality is not already a problem and
governance is relatively transparent.
We then considered the factors that might promote participation. While most theories of col-
lective action conclude that inequality and other forms of heterogeneity curtail efficient group
formation and cooperation, the empirical evidence is inconsistent. Focusing on individual be-
havior rather than group dynamics lends more insight into how living in the context of social
or economic inequality can influence a person’s decision to participate in community develop-
ment. In particular, inequality may create social tension to which people tend to be adverse.
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That social friction can be explained by bringing the concept of identity into play: individuals
benefit from identifying or fitting in with a particular social category, and they suffer the cost
of cognitive dissonance when acting out or witnessing behavior that diverges from the pre-
scripts of their chosen social category. As the distribution of characteristics increases within
a population (that is, as a population becomes more heterogeneous), the number of social
categories increases, and the population becomes more fragmented. In this way, inequality
can be detrimental to participation. This study contributes to the literature by adapting
the identity-augmented utility model to explain political participation, and it tests the model
using original data from a medium-sized city—Missoula, Montana—in the Rocky Mountain
West. It therefore helps address the general question of how inequality interacts with an in-
dividual’s decision to participate in local government and community development. Because
the survey sample stratified the city into neighborhoods, the analysis will also provide insight
into the question of whether inequality influences participation within subsets of a population
the same way it does for the population as a whole.
The chapter ended by framing the importance of the research question in terms of the historical
changes in income inequality within the United States and the state of Montana during the
20th century. Inequality has been increasing in both the nation and the state throughout the
past 4 decades, although the rate at which inequality increased in Montana was less than that
of the rest of the U.S.. Insofar, then, as Montana has an interest in enjoying a vibrant political
culture with widespread and representative citizen participation, it is important to determine
how its changing distribution of wealth might promote or discourage that vision of society.
Chapter 3
Theoretical Model
Using a simple cost-benefit analysis, we model an individual’s decision to participate in civic
activities. Simply put, an individual will choose to participate when the benefits of doing so
are greater than the costs. A crucial assumption is that there are two basic kinds of costs
and benefits: those that are purely economic and those that are psychological, the latter of
which are referred to as “identity benefits”. Akerlof and Kranton (2000, 2002, 2005) first
incorporated this idea of identity benefits into the standard utility model, and the theory
used in this study relies heavily on their work.
Economic benefits come from having one’s voice heard during deliberation on public policy
as well as being able to enjoy the public goods provided by the deliberation process. In the
context of Missoula’s municipal and neighborhood meetings, this might mean revising pro-
posals for road construction, prohibiting the establishment of a casino in one’s neighborhood,
playing a role in composing the homeowners’ association bylaws, or simply working to build
a community garden in an empty and unsightly plot. Since everyone can enjoy these public
goods to the same extent, the economic benefit from the public goods is fixed. But those who
participate in local government also benefit from being able to have a say in what goods are
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provided. Denoting the gross economic benefits from participating as b̄∗ = b̄ + v, where v is
the additional economic benefit from having one’s voice heard, and gross economic benefits
from not participating as b̄, gives the identity:
b̄∗ > b̄ (3.1)
Net economic benefits from participating, BP , is just the gross economic benefits less economic
costs (as a proportion of the individual’s resources) associated with participating, such as
transportation, time, and membership costs. Since those who do not participate incur no
economic costs, the net benefit from not participating, BN , is the same as the gross benefit.
That is:
BPij = b̄
∗ − pij
and (3.2)
BN = b̄
Identity benefits are the good feelings people get from taking an active role in community life
and associating with others who also have a preference for a healthy community. Similarly,
identity costs come from a feeling of not fitting in or associating with a community composed of
those whom one sees as fundamentally different than oneself. This study uses neighborhoods
to proxy for that community. To see why neighborhoods are a natural reference group,
consider the Jones’s and why it is so important to keep up with them. It is common for
people to compare themselves to their neighbors and model their behavior accordingly. The
importance people place on fitting in with their community, which we denote t̄, depends on a
combination of values and traditions of the community and a stochastic element representing
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unique personality traits. For simplicity, t̄ is taken as fixed across neighborhoods within a
city. The net identity benefits of participating for individual i in neighborhood j is given by:
IP − t̄|ci − c∗j | (3.3)
where IP represents the identity benefits associated with participating, and |ci − c∗j | is the
weighted absolute value of the difference between the characteristics of the individual (ci) and
the characteristics of the of archetypal or ideal member of the community (c∗j ). An important
assumption is that individual characteristics, ci, are uniformly distributed across the interval
[µ− σ2 , µ +
σ
2 ], as shown below:
µ− σ2 µ µ +
σ
2
Note that the entire length of the distribution is σ, and that increases in σ indicate greater
levels of heterogeneity within the community. On the other hand, those who do not participate
gain identity benefits, INij .
1
Putting this together, the utility for those who participate is:
UPij = b̄
∗ − pij + IP − t̄|ci − c∗j | (3.4)
Those who do not participate gain utility:
1It makes sense to assume that citizens still benefit from not participating. Non-participants, for example,
still get to enjoy the community garden or the quieter street. As for identity benefits from dropping out, in
addition to avoiding the cost t̄|ci − c∗j |, people might have a more positive sense of self for not having designed
(a negative) public policy.
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UN = b̄ + IN (3.5)
Individuals will participate when:
UPij > U
N
b̄∗ − pij + IP − t̄|ci − c∗j | > b̄ + IN
(b̄∗ − b̄) + (IP − IN ) > pij + t̄|ci − c∗j |
v + (IP − IN ) > pij + t̄|ci − c∗j | (3.6)
We wish to identify the critical values of ci where individuals choose not to participate. In
order to isolate the effect of heterogeneity on identity and participation, consider a special
case where pij = 0 for all is and js. Using equation 3.6, the value of ci where individuals
from the lower end of the distribution (i.e., those individuals for whom ci < c∗j ) choose not to
participate is:
v + IP − t̄(c∗j − ci) = IN
v + IP − t̄c∗j + t̄ci = IN
t̄ci = IN − IP − v + t̄c∗j
cleft criti =
IN − IP − v + t̄c∗j
t
(3.7)
Using cleft criti , it is possible to find the proportion of the population from the left side of the
distribution that chooses not to participate. The proportion of a uniform distribution over
CHAPTER 3. THEORETICAL MODEL 23
the interval [a, b] to the left of some point, x, which also lies on the interval [a, b], is given by
x−a
b−a . Applying this identity, we get:
P left drop out =
cleft criti − (µ−
σ
2 )
(µ + σ2 )− (µ−
σ
2 )
=
1
2
+
cleft criti − µ
σ
=
1
2
+
IN − IP − v + t̄c∗j
t̄σ
− µ
σ
=
1
2
+
IN − IP − v + t̄(c∗j − µ)
t̄σ
(3.8)
Similarly, the proportion of the population that drops out from the right side of the distribution
(i.e., those with ci > c∗j ) is given by:
P right dropout =
1
2
+
IN − IP − v + t̄(µ− c∗j )
t̄σ
(3.9)
Finally, the total proportion of the population that chooses not to participate will be:
P dropout = 1− 2(v + I
P − IN )
t̄σ
(3.10)
The proportion of the population that will choose not to participate, then, is decreasing in
the responsiveness of the community to an individual’s political voice, v, and the identity
payoff to participating, all of which make intuitive sense. The proportion that chooses not to
participate is increasing in the identity payoff to not participating, the weight the community
places on being different, and the size of the interval from which individual characteristics
can be drawn, σ. As noted, the size of that interval, σ, represents the degree of heterogeneity
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within a community. This shows, then, how increases in forms of heterogeneity such as
inequality have an adverse effect on participation.
The total proportion of the population that will drop out is invariant with respect to the
population mean set of characteristics (µ) and the value of the community ideal set of char-
acteristics (c∗j ). However, these values do affect the side of the distribution from which the
majority of people drop out. If c∗j is greater than µ, then more will drop out from the left side
of the distribution. This makes intuitive sense. If a person is below average, and the standard
for participation is someone who is above average, that person will have a disincentive to
participate. And the further above the average that standard is, the greater the disincentive
for those who are below-average.
The main implications of this theory are that heterogeneity decreases participation within the
entire population, as does an individual’s divergence from the ideal characteristics of his or
her group, but increasing the responsiveness to public input or decreasing the penalty (t) from
being different can mitigate the negative effects of heterogeneity. While policy prescriptions
can affect the former, there is little that can be done to change the latter (although Scheufele
et al. (2004) show that the likelihood a person will attend a meeting increases dramatically
if he or she has been received a personal invitation). Nevertheless, working to increase civic
bodies’ responsiveness to citizen input in order to increase participation is perhaps more
easily measured and more worthwhile. It is not only beneficial to new participants, but it also
strengthens the democratic structure of the civic body and increases efficiency by facilitating
the transmission of information. The next chapter describes the data set used to test the
hypotheses that inequality reduces participation and that having different characteristics than
the ideal can influence participation decisions.
Chapter 4
Empirical Evidence: The Data
Between July 2006 and January 2007, data were collected from a city-wide door-to-door survey
of 683 households in Missoula, Montana. The sampling method followed a stratified random
sample, with at least 40 households being drawn from each of the 17 neighborhoods serving as
the strata. Neighborhoods are defined by the city, and their collective boundaries encompass
the entire perimeter of the city. Face-to-face interviews generally lasted 15 minutes, although
some lasted as little as 10 minutes while others took nearly an hour. The questionnaire
appears in Appendix A, which also gives more detailed descriptions of the questionnaire
design, sampling method, and interview process.
4.1 Demographics and Neighborhood Characteristics
Table 4.1 on page 26 gives summary statistics for city-wide demographics. Estimating city-
wide parameters using the stratified data presents a challenge, since some neighborhoods
are larger than others, and certain households therefore have a higher probability of being
selected. To account for this, each observation is weighted by the inverse probability that the
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observation was surveyed on account of survey design. In other words, the sampling weight
of the observation’s stratum determines the number of subjects in the population that each
observation represents.1
Table 4.1: City-wide demographics
Variable Mean Std. Dev. Min. Max. Obs.
Proportion of population 0.498 0.5 0 1 682
that is female
Age 46.85 18.0 18 94 682
Proportion of population 0.669 0.47 0 1 682
that owns home
Years spent in Missoula 20.124 17.74 <1 90 682
Years spent at current residence 9.477 11.981 <1 70 682
Proportion of population 0.727 0.446 0 1 682
that is employed
Proportion of population 0.580 0.494 0 1 682
that is married or partnered
Household size 2.5 1.307 1 9 682
Children per household 0.533 0.974 0 8 682
Estimated years of schooling 15.1 3.0 8 22 682
Proportion of population 0.118 0.323 0 1 682
in college
Estimated household income 63.883 68.211 1.4995 750 682
(in 1000s USD)
1For example, if neighborhood A represents 15% of the total population, then each observation from that
neighborhood is weighted by 1
0.15
= 6.667, making each observation from neighborhood A represent 6.667
subjects in the entire population. If neighborhood B represents 20% of the population, then each observation
from neighborhood B represents 1
0.2
= 5 subjects in the entire population. The weighting scheme, therefore,
makes every observation equally probable of having been selected—it imposes randomness on the non-random
element of the sample.
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The average citizen has lived in Missoula for about 20 years and at his or her current residence
for almost 10 years. Approximately 49.8% of the population is female, and the average age
of Missoulians over 18 is about 47 years old. 58% are married or in a long-term partnership,
and each couple have a little bit more than half a child. The average household has 2.5
members. For the most part, these estimates correspond to figures available from the U.S.
Census Bureau (2005), although our estimate of the percentage of homeowners is at least
10 percentage points higher. The U.S. Census Bureau does not provide an estimate of the
mean age, but their median age is 34.3, which is over 10 years younger than the median age
(45) in our data. This is likely due to the fact that our sample excludes individuals under
18 years old. The average number of years of schooling is about 15, which suggests that
most people have had some college. Interestingly, the standard deviation is 3 years, meaning
68.27% of the population attained between a high school diploma and a master’s degree. The
estimated average household income is $63,883 which is just within the U.S. Census Bureau’s
range for estimated mean family income, which is between $50,772 and $64,344 (2005). The
large estimated standard deviation of income is due to the right-skewed shape of the income
distribution. The median income is $42,499.50, and the mode is $54,999.50.
The estimates of years of education and household income deserve special attention. Because
the goal is to estimate inequality measurements that depend on continuous data, integer
values for years of schooling and income are inferred from categorical responses.2 Respondents
identified themselves as belonging to 1 of 10 categories representing the highest degree or level
of schooling completed. Similarly, respondents identified themselves by 1 of the 23 household
income categories containing their 2005 before-tax total household income.3 To illustrate,
suppose a respondent identified her highest degree or level of schooling as a bachelor’s degree
and her 2005 household income as falling within the range $35,000 – $39,999. Then, the
2The inferred values of years of education and income supply information to construct neighborhood-level
measurements of wealth and educational inequality. Because the margin of error is higher for the inferred
incomes, household-level regressions use only the categorical information supplied by the respondent. The
estimated number of years of education, however, appears in household regressions, since any errors would be
relatively small and theoretically insignificant.
3See Appendix A for the wording of the original questions and categories.
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variable representing her education would be coded as “6”, and the variable representing
her income would be coded as “14”. Her estimated years of education would be 16 and her
estimated income would be the midpoint of her specified income category, $37,499.50. Of
course, she may have skipped a grade in elementary school, and she may earn an income at
the upper bound of her income group. The assumptions underlying these estimates, however,
should appear to the reader as reasonable.
A more critical assumption involves estimating integer values for respondents within the high-
est income bracket, which is open-ended. 62 respondents indicated that they had a household
income of $120,000 or greater. Since the upper bound of that category is uncertain, it is im-
possible to assign respondents an income at the midpoint. Even with value of the maximum
income, however, it would not make much sense to assign every respondent an income at the
midpoint, since income tends not to be uniformly distributed at the upper percentile (Cowell,
1977; Kakwani, 1976; Wikipedia, 2006). For example, if the maximum income were $750,000,
assigning an income of $435,000 to all 62 respondents in the highest income bracket would be
inappropriate, since we know most of the 62 respondents would have incomes closer to the
lower bound with only a few having incomes closer to the maximum. The Pareto distribution
captures the shape of income-allocation at its upper tail (Cowell, 1977). It states that the
proportion of the population whose income exceeds any positive number, x > xm is given by:
(xm
x
)α
where xm is the minimum possible income (in our case, $120,000), x is any income greater than
the minimum, and the positive parameter α is an inequality measurement called the Pareto
index. As α increases, the proportion of extremely high income individuals gets smaller;
Gastwirth (1972) suggests that α is around 2 in the U.S.. This study adopts the value of
α = 2 and randomly assigns each of the 62 respondents in the top income bracket to an
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income according to a Pareto distribution. For example, the number observations out of the
62 estimated to have an income greater than $250,000 is given by:
62 ∗
(120, 000
250, 000
)2
≈ 14
Similarly, the function predicts that 12 people have incomes greater than $270,000. Therefore,
two people would have incomes between $250,000 and $270,000. Thus, we randomly assign
an income of $250,000 to two of the 62 respondents in the top income group. Repeating
this process yields the cumulative income distribution that appears in Figure 4.1 on page 29.
Again, it is worth emphasizing that this process only helps to make inferences about city and
neighborhood level income distribution; who gets what income is not important, since these
income estimates do not appear in any household-level analyses. Instead, they allow facilitate
calculating more informative descriptive statistics as well as a number of measurements of
inequality.
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Figure 4.1: Cumulative household income distribution using estimated income
This study uses two common inequality measurements: the Gini coefficient and the Thiel
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index. The Gini coefficient is a ratio between 0 and 1, where 0 represents perfect equality,
and 1 represents absolute inequality. The Thiel index also indicates perfect inequality when
its value is 0, but the Thiel index can take infinitely large values. Following Gastwirth et al.
(1986), both a lower-bound Gini coefficient as well as an upper-bound are calculated, where
the lower-bound is the value of the Gini coefficient assuming perfect equality within income
brackets, and the upper-bound is the value of the Gini coefficient assuming perfect inequality.
This gives a range of all possible Gini coefficients, given the grouped data, and avoids the mis-
measurements common to interpolated Gini coefficients. Applied to this data set, however,
there is little difference between the lower and upper-bounds.
We use the method described by Thomas et al. (2001) for calculating Gini coefficients of
education, where the Gini coefficient is given by:
1
µ
n∑
i=2
i−1∑
j=i
pi|yi − yj |pj
where µ is the average years of schooling across the population, pi and pj represent the pro-
portions of the population with levels of schooling i and j, yi and yj represent the number of
years of schooling for i and j, and n is the number of categories of educational attainment. We
calculate the education Gini for each neighborhood, but since the Gini coefficient is sensitive
to small population sizes, we adjust it by a factor of 1N−1 (Thomas et al., 2001). Here, N
represents the number of observations in each neighborhood. The Thiel index of education,
however, requires no such adjustment (Thomas et al., 2002). Table 4.2 gives summary statis-
tics, and Table 4.3 gives neighborhood inequality calculations, both using the estimated values
of income and years of education discussed above.4 Finally, Table 4.4, starting on page 33,
gives descriptive statistics for each of the neighborhoods.
In Missoula, the estimate of the average level of inequality (for both the lower and the upper
4Please see Appendix B for a map of the Neighborhood Councils and a key for the numbering system used
in the tables to represent the councils.
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Table 4.2: Summary statistics for inequality measurements
Variable Mean Std. Dev. Min. Max.
Lower-bound
income Gini
0.398 0.074 0.224 0.526
Upper-bound
income Gini
0.405 0.074 0.231 0.53
Thiel index on
income
0.303 0.132 0.086 0.697
Education
Gini
0.1 0.009 0.082 0.123
Thiel index on
education
(x10) 0.172 0.027 0.124 0.231
Observations 682
bounded Gini coefficients) approximates 0.4, which is well below the 1998 national estimate
of 0.553 published by the Federal Reserve Bank of Minneapolis (Rodŕıguez et al., 2002). The
education Gini coefficient is much lower—around 0.1—but the U.S. policy of compulsory ed-
ucation explains this fully. When we look to Table 4.3, we can see that neighborhood 6
(South 39th Street) has the most equal distribution of income, and neighborhood 5 (South-
gate Triangle) has the most equal distribution of educational attainment. Interestingly, these
neighborhoods both have relatively low levels of average income and years of schooling, re-
spectively. The Northside (neighborhood 17) has the highest degree of income inequality.
Neighborhood 1, Grant Creek, features the highest level of educational inequality. Again, it is
interesting to note that the mean number of years of education in Grant Creek is 15.95—nearly
the equivalent of a 4-year post-secondary degree. The most equal distribution of education
is in neighborhood 3 (Emma Dickenson / Orchard Homes), where the mean number of years
of schooling is 13.71, the second lowest in city. Of course, this makes some sense, since most
everyone attains a high school degree (or its equivalent) by law. If most everyone attains a
minimum level of education but few go beyond that, the distribution is more equal, even if
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such a situation is not typically thought of as being equitable.
Table 4.3: Inequality measurements by neighborhood
Neighborhood
Variable (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) (9) (10) (11) (12) (13) (14) (15) (16) (17)
Lower-
bound
income
Gini
.37 .37 .41 .40 .29 .22 .38 .48 .46 .31 .41 .45 .50 .43 .39 .37 .53
Upper-
bound
income
Gini
.38 .37 .42 .40 .30 .23 .38 .49 .47 .32 .42 .45 .51 .43 .39 .38 .53
Thiel
index
on
income
.28 .25 .32 .27 .14 .08 .29 .43 .37 .17 .29 .34 .42 .32 .25 .24 .67
Education
Gini
.12 .11 .08 .10 .09 .11 .10 .09 .09 .10 .10 .09 .11 .10 .11 .11 .10
Thiel
index
of edu-
cation
(x10)
.23 .20 .12 .20 .14 .18 .17 .16 .15 .15 .15 .14 .19 .18 .21 .18 .18
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4.2 Patterns of participation in Missoula
The community and household information described above is intended to help make predic-
tions about how households participate in civic life. Accordingly, the majority of the survey
asks about household patterns of political and civic behavior. The questions about partic-
ipation in local government—city councils, city boards and commissions, and neighborhood
councils—exactly replicate those in a telephone survey commissioned by Missoula’s Local
Government Study Commission in November, 2005. This study conducted by the Behavior
Research Center finds that over 20% of Missoulians personally attend neighborhood councils,
16% attend city council meetings, and 10% attend city board meetings. Additionally, nearly
40% watch city council meetings on MCAT—the city’s public access television station—20%
watch city board meetings, and 7% watch neighborhood council meetings(2005). The ques-
tionnaire replicates the Behavior Research Center’s queries in order to compare and check
whether these figures might be inflated due to sampling biases associated with telephone sur-
veys, although we add the option of participating by reading a transcript of the meeting, too.
Our survey also asks about volunteering, participation in political organizations, contacting
public officials through writing or telephone, and writing letters to the editor of a newspaper.
All questions refer to the activities of members of the respondent’s household during the 12
months preceding the time they took the survey. Table 4.5 gives a cursory description of
participation in Missoula.
About 33% of Missoulians participate in city council meetings in some way. Of those who do,
77% participate by watching it on television, and 27% of those who participated in city council
meetings did so by attending in person. City board and commission meetings enjoy about
half as much citizen engagement, most of which is solitary (63% participate via television
or transcripts.). Interestingly, although neighborhood councils have the smallest proportion
of participants, most of those who do participate do so by attending in person (72%), and
only 24% watch the meetings on MCAT. Participation in home owners’ associations is also
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relatively low, although our figure is likely to be understated, since there was no question to
determine whether respondents live in an area where a home owners’ association is present.
35% of respondents reported having contacted a public official—over the phone, in writing,
or in person—during the year before they took the survey, although only 11.6% had written
a letter to the editor of a newspaper. Nearly 60% reported that someone in their household
had volunteered.
Table 4.5: Summary statistics of participation
Variable Mean Std. Dev. Min. Max. Obs.
City council 0.334 0.472 0 1 682
—in person 0.268 0.444 0 1 228
—MCAT 0.772 0.421 0 1 228
—transcript 0.044 0.205 0 1 228
City boards & Commissions 0.173 0.379 0 1 682
—in person 0.415 0.495 0 1 118
—MCAT 0.602 0.492 0 1 118
—transcript 0.034 0.182 0 1 118
Home owners’ 0.158 0.365 0 1 682
—in person 0.917 0.278 0 1 108
—transcript 0.102 0.304 0 1 108
Neighborhood council 0.119 0.324 0 1 682
—in person 0.722 0.451 0 1 79
—MCAT 0.244 0.432 0 1 78
—transcript 0.052 0.223 0 1 77
Contact public official 0.352 0.478 0 1 682
Editor 0.116 0.32 0 1 682
Political organizations 0.204 0.403 0 1 682
Volunteer 0.591 0.492 0 1 682
Other meeting 0.207 0.405 0 1 682
Because the theory predicts that heterogeneity in communities discourages participation in-
volving groups, it will be useful to distinguish between those who do not participate at all,
those who participate in civic life without any group interaction, and those who participate in
person. A new variable captures this perspective on the kind of participation in which people
engage. The variable takes on three values:
 0: Respondent did not participate in any of the activities in any way
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 1: Respondent watched a meeting on MCAT, read a meeting’s transcript, contacted a
public official, or wrote a letter to the editor of a newspaper, but did not attend any
meetings in person
 2: Respondent participated by attending at least one meeting in person
Note two things about this variable. First, it does not reflect volunteer activity or involvement
in political organizations, since it is not clear whether those activities are necessarily social or
private. Second, although the values of this variable are mutually exclusive, respondents who
are in category 2 (and attended in person) may have participated alone as well. A case could
be made to further divide this category into those who participate only in person and those
who participate both in person and alone. Whatever the theoretical merits to this, there is a
practical barrier to adding such a 4th category. The group of those who participate in person
and alone would include only 9 respondents, which is too small to contribute to a meaningful
analysis. Table 4.6 show the frequencies of our new variable, participation type.
Table 4.6: Frequency table for types of participation
Variable Frequency Percentage Cumulative Percentage
0 None 212 31.09 31.09
1 Alone 209 30.65 61.73
2 In person 261 38.27 100.00
Total 682 100.00
It is also informative to look at the demographics of respondents according to their type
of participation. Table 4.7 on page 39 describes the characteristics of respondents by their
participation type. Here we see that the population of those who participate in person has
the highest average income, years of education, and proportion of homeowners. This group
also has spent the most time in Missoula in general and their current residence, in particular.
Additionally, the population of those who participate in person has the highest proportion of
women. The case is quite the opposite for those who do not participate at all. These people
have spent the fewest number of years in Missoula and their current residences, less than
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half are married, and they have the lowest average income and years of schooling. All of this
supports the SES model described in Chapter 2, Section 2.2.2. However, it is still necessary to
explore how the level of inequality in a community might effect participation. Unfortunately,
the raw statistics on inequality, shown in the bottom rows of Table 4.7, are not helpful to this
end. By abstracting from household behavior, and instead focusing briefly on trends within
neighborhoods, the role of inequality on participation may become more clear.
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A scatterplot of each neighborhood’s proportion of non-participants, solo-participants, and
group-participants against the inequality measurements, along with a fitted regression line,
shows some indication of a relationship between the two phenomena. Figures 4.2– 4.4 perform
this operation using the lower-bound Gini coefficient on estimated income, and Figures 4.5– 4.7
use the Thiel index on education. Beyond wishing to show this relationship for both income
and education inequality, the choice of which inequality measures to show was arbitrary, since
this visual relationship is consistent across all our inequality measurements.
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Figure 4.2: Fitted line and scatter of neighborhood % non-participants on income Gini
What this exercise suggests is that inequality does play a role in the way people participate
in local government. As both income and education inequality increase, the percentage of the
population that does not participate at all appears to decrease (Figures 4.2 and 4.5). This
appears to be inconsistent with the theory outlined in Chapter 3, although that model only
allows for a binary option: to participate or not to participate. In Missoula, the additional
means to participation may change the outcome, even though the calculus may stay the same.
What is clearly consistent with the theoretical model is the indication in Figures 4.3 and 4.6
of a positive relationship between inequality and participating alone. Neighborhoods with
higher levels of inequality also have higher levels of solitary participation. Finally, the plots of
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Figure 4.3: Fitted line and scatter of neighborhood % solo-participants on income Gini
the percentage of the neighborhood that participates in person on inequality have ambiguous
implications.
It is important to stress, however, that although these fitted lines are useful diagnostic tools,
they do not hold other variables constant. The next chapter develops an empirical strategy
to test the implications of our model, as adapted to a three choice situation, and presents the
results of a more formal econometric analysis.
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Figure 4.4: Fitted line and scatter of neighborhood % group participants on income Gini
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Figure 4.5: Fitted line and scatter of neighborhood % non-participants on education Thiel
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Figure 4.6: Fitted line and scatter of neighborhood % solo-participants on education Thiel
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Figure 4.7: Fitted line and scatter of neighborhood % group participants on education Thiel
Chapter 5
Empirical Evidence: Method and
Results
Recall from equation 3.4 on page 21 that an individual’s decision to participate is modeled
with an identity-augmented utility function adapted from Akerlof and Kranton (2000, 2002,
2005) and that overall participation decreases as heterogeneity (σ from the model) increases.
We do not observe the level of utility, but only the respondents’ participatory behavior. The
theoretical model only allowed for a single choice between two options: to participate or
not to participate. In Missoula, however, citizens have at least two choices between three
options. After citizens first choose whether to participate, those who have not opted out
make a second decision about how to participate. Now citizens can choose not to participate,
to participate alone by watching a meeting on television or contact a public official, or to
participate in traditional face-to-face interaction. Those whose identity costs outweighed
their benefits would have chosen not to participate under the two-choice scenario, but under
this three-choice scenario with the option of participating without direct human contact, they
now have the option to gain some identity benefits from being involved in public life at a lower
identity cost. As long as the identity payoffs from participating alone are greater than the
44
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identity payoffs of not participating at all, we might expect participation to increase when an
additional avenue into civic life is introduced.
5.1 Empirical Strategy
The strategy, then, is to predict the likelihood that an individual, i, living in neighborhood j,
will exhibit a certain pattern of participatory behavior. This dependent variable, participation
type, takes on the values 0, 1, and 2, where 0 indicates that individuals did not participate in
any of the surveyed activities, 1 indicates the individual participated alone, and 2 indicates the
individual participated in person. The following general econometric specification to predicts
how individuals participate in civic activities:
Pij = αXij + βHj + γZj + εij (5.1)
where P is the type of participation, α, β, and γ are vectors of coefficients, Xij is a vector
of household characteristics, Hj is a measurement of neighborhood heterogeneity, and Zj is a
vector of other neighborhood characteristics. Table 5.1 on page 47 shows the specific variables
within each vector. Although our theoretical model makes the simplifying assumption to hold
economic costs of participation constant, in reality, these costs will vary, and we use household
characteristics to proxy for the economic costs of participation. The variables in Xij control
for the respondent’s gender, age, square of age, whether the respondent rents or owns, and
whether the respondent had worked at all in the last six months. Xij also accounts for the
respondent’s marital status, household size, and number of children. Finally, Xij controls
for the estimated years of schooling, whether the respondent is in college, and whether the
respondent has a low, medium, or high household income.1 Zj controls for neighborhood
1“Low income” includes respondents who reported household incomes less than or equal to $24,999, “middle
income” includes respondents who reported household incomes between $25,000 and $59,999, and “high income”
includes respondents who reported incomes higher than $60,000. These categories come from the tri-modal
distribution of income groups; “low income” and “high income” each include roughly 30% of the population,
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characteristics such as the mean household size, mean estimated years of education, mean
estimated income, and the number of households in the neighborhood. The heterogeneity
variable, Hj , measures inequality in income and education. This corresponds to σ in our
theoretical model and is our interest variable. We conduct a series of regressions, using the
Gini and Thiel indices on both income and education, and expect the effect of all Hj to be
negative for the outcome of not participating, positive for the outcome of participating alone,
and negative for the outcome of participating in person. We estimate P , a polychotomous
variable, with a multinomial logit model. This econometric model specifies that the predicted
probability of an outcome Y such that a person will choose participation type k is:
Pr(Y = k|x) = e
xβk|b∑2
j=0 e
xβj|b
where b is the base outcome and j is number of possible outcomes ranging from 0 to 2. Results
from this estimation appear in the following section.
5.2 Results
5.2.1 Income inequality
The next two sections give results from equation 5.1. The first regressions show the effect
of a neighborhood’s level of income inequality on the likelihood that a person living in that
neighborhood will not participate at all, participate alone, or participate in person. Table 5.2
on page 50 gives the marginal effects of three multinomial logit models; model 1 uses the
lower-bound Gini index to measure income inequality, model 2 uses the upper-bound Gini
index, and model 3 uses the Thiel index. Raw coefficients appear in Table C.1 in Appendix C.
All 3 regressions pass the Wald and LR tests for combining outcome categories, so the null
and “medium income” includes the other 40%.
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Table 5.1: Model variables arranged by vector
Xi Hj Zj
Female Lower-bound Mean House-
income Gini hold size
Age Upper-bound Mean years
income Gini of education
Age2 Thiel index Mean income
of income
Homeowner Education Gini Number of
households
Working Education Thiel
index
Married Abs(individual inc. – mean inc.)
Household size Abs(individual educ. – mean educ.)
Number of children Abs(individual inc. – median inc.)
Estimated years Abs(individual educ. – median educ.)
of schooling
Student Abs(individual inc. – maximum inc.)
Low income Abs(individual educ. – maximum educ.)
High income Abs(individual inc. – mean participant inc.)
Abs(indivdual educ. – mean participant educ.)
Only a single variable in Hj appears in each regression
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hypothesis that categories can be collapsed (into a binary logit, for example) is rejected. Both
the Hausman and the Small-Hsiao tests of the IIA assumptions2 hold for Model 1, which
uses the lower-bound income Gini index as its inequality measurement. However, the reader
should be cautioned that the Small-Hsiao test does not hold for Model 2 when outcome
1 (participating alone) is omitted, and the Hausman test does not hold for model 3 when
outcome 0 (not participating at all) is omitted. In all models, standard errors are clustered
by neighborhood, which also corrects for heteroskedasticity using an adaptation of Huber and
White’s correction (Gutierrez and Drukker, 2006). Finally, results for all models are adjusted
by sampling weights.
The results support the hypothesis that increases in income inequality would lead to a decrease
in the likelihood that an individual would not participate at all when there is an option to
participate alone. A 1 standard deviation increase in either the lower or upper-bound of the
income Gini index implies a 4.4 percentage point decrease in the probability that someone
will not participate at all, relative to the other options of participating alone or in person,
holding all else constant. This is significant at the 1% level. A 1 standard deviation increase
in the Thiel index on income implies a 3.3 percentage point decrease in the probability that
someone will drop out, relative to the other two options and holding all else constant, and this
is significant at the 10% level. In all three models, the income inequality measurements have
positive signs for participating alone, yet none are statistically significant. There is, however,
no indication that any of the three models supports the hypotheses that increasing inequality
decreases group-based participation.
The other effects of the control variables are what might be expected. Gender has no signifi-
cant effect on whether or how people participate in community activities, but people become
more likely to participate both alone and in person, up to a certain point. During the survey,
enumerators informally observed that most post-retirement age respondents reported dimin-
2The IIA (Independence of Irrelevant Alternatives) assumption states that the relative odds between two
or more existing alternatives do not change change when additional outcomes are added.
5.2. RESULTS 49
ished or wholly discontinued participation after previously vigorous involvement in community
matters. Many attributed this to there being no strong incentive to participate after their
children left home, others suggested that they were allowing room for newer generations to
shape civic life, still others reported a simple lack of interest or will. In all three models,
the quality of being a homeowner decreases the probability of dropping out by 17 percentage
points, relative to participating alone or in person, and it increases the probability of partici-
pating in person by 18 percentage points, relative to not participating at all or participating
alone, ceteris paribus. This is significant at the 5% error level. On the other hand, the prob-
ability of participating alone increases by 11.4 percentage points, relative to the other two
options, for those who have worked within the previous 6 months, holding all else constant.
This is significant at the 10% error level. Surprisingly, the number of children under 18 years
old is statistically insignificant, although the number of people in the respondent’s household
has a moderately significant negative effect (at the 10% error level) on the probability that
an individual will not participate at all, relative to the options of participating alone or in
person. Household size and number of children, however, are somewhat correlated (0.7878),
and Wald tests confirmed joint significance in all the models.
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Finally, it is interesting to note the effects of household income and the estimated number
of years of schooling. First, in all three models, low income households are more likely to
drop out from participation entirely than to participate alone or in person, although this
effect is not statistically significant. The same is true of high income households, although
the effect is statistically significant (at the 10% level) for the option of participating alone.
Although household income has a mostly insignificant effect on whether or how individuals
participate, the amount of schooling one has experienced is highly significant. As the years of
education one has received increases, the probability that the individual will not participate
at all decreases, relative to the options of participating alone or in person, ceteris paribus.
This is significant at the 10% level, and a 1 standard deviation increase in years of education
implies a 6.1 percentage point decrease in the probability that a person will drop out, given the
alternative options of participating alone or in person. Furthermore, a 1 standard deviation
increase in years of schooling implies a 6.2 percentage point increase in the probability that an
individual will participate in person, given the other alternatives and holding all else constant.
This is significant at the 1% error level.
While it is somewhat surprising that income and income inequality are not strongly significant,
it could be the case that residents of Missoula, Montana look more to education for their
identity. This might be due to the fact that highly skilled workers in Montana face the largest
wage-cuts (Barrett, 1999), and with compressed wages, income differentials are smaller and
less important. Additionally, since wage compression is greatest among the most highly skilled
(and, by extension, mobile) workers, the fact that they elect to stay in Montana suggests that
income is not the most important factor in Montanans’ utility or identity. In Missoula, in
particular, the presence of the university may cause a more natural rift between social groups.
Rather than people identifying primarily as high or low income, they may identify as modestly
or highly educated. The following section applies education to equation 5.1 to examine this
further.
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5.2.2 Educational inequality
Table 5.3 on page 55 shows results from equation 5.1 using educational inequality. The
independent variables of interest are the Gini index and the Thiel index on estimated years
of schooling; Model 4 in Table 5.3 uses the Gini, and Model 5 uses the Thiel index. As
before, a multinomial logit model is used to predict the relative probability of dropping out
of civic participation all together, participating alone, and participating in person. For both
models, the Wald test and the LR test for combining outcome categories indicate that these
three outcomes cannot be collapsed into a binomial regression. The IIA assumption holds for
Model 4 under the Hausman and the Small-Hsiao tests, although Model 5 fails the Small-Hsiao
test when the option of participating alone is omitted. Finally, both models are adjusted by
sampling weights, and the standard errors are clustered by neighborhood, which also corrects
for heteroskedasticity.
Compared to the previous models, those using educational inequality to proxy for a commu-
nity’s heterogeneity are more supportive of the hypothesis that increased inequality dissuades
individuals from engaging in community development via groups. A 1 standard deviation
increase in the education Gini index implies a 3 percentage point increase in the probability
that an individual will participate alone, relative to the options of participating in person or
not at all, ceteris paribus. Similarly, a 1 standard deviation increase in the Thiel index of
education implies a 3.3 percentage point increase in the probability that someone will partici-
pate alone, given the other options. In both cases, these effects are significant at the 1% error
level. Nevertheless, when given the option to participate alone—in addition to the option of
participating in person—increasing education inequality decreases the probability that and
individual will choose not to participate at all. Relative to the other options, the same 1
standard deviation increase in the education Gini and education Thiel indices imply 3.5 and
3.2 percentage point decreases, respectively, in the probability that an individual will drop
out entirely, holding all else constant. These last effects are significant at the 10% error level.
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So, as inequality increases, people participate more, but they do so alone.
Table 5.3: Marginal effects of education inequality on participation type
Multinomial Logit
Dependent variable = Participation Type
Model 4 Model 5
None Alone In person None Alone In person
Female -0.0541 0.00907 0.0450 -0.0529 0.00868 0.0441
(0.0301) (0.0385) (0.0283) (0.0300) (0.0386) (0.0279)
Age -0.0235∗∗∗ 0.00826 0.0153∗∗ -0.0233∗∗∗ 0.00811 0.0152∗∗
(0.00559) (0.00615) (0.00579) (0.00563) (0.00622) (0.00579)
Age2 0.000220∗∗∗ -0.0000771 -0.000143∗ 0.000218∗∗∗ -0.0000755 -0.000142∗
(0.0000541) (0.0000620) (0.0000568) (0.0000543) (0.0000622) (0.0000566)
Homeowner -0.166∗∗ -0.0246 0.179∗∗ -0.166∗∗ -0.0247 0.178∗∗
(0.0574) (0.0513) (0.0611) (0.0575) (0.0512) (0.0609)
Years at -0.00401∗ 0.000991 0.00301 -0.00399∗ 0.00103 0.00296
current res. (0.00188) (0.00215) (0.00167) (0.00187) (0.00214) (0.00166)
Working -0.0654 0.114∗ -0.0467 -0.0636 0.112∗ -0.0469
(0.0459) (0.0506) (0.0525) (0.0460) (0.0504) (0.0522)
Married 0.0964∗ -0.0317 -0.0687 0.0965∗ -0.0321 -0.0683
(0.0464) (0.0586) (0.0474) (0.0465) (0.0581) (0.0472)
Household -0.0561∗ 0.0219 0.0342 -0.0558∗ 0.0218 0.0340
size (0.0250) (0.0345) (0.0410) (0.0248) (0.0344) (0.0408)
Number of 0.00326 -0.0430 0.0398 0.00326 -0.0430 0.0397
children (0.0241) (0.0416) (0.0396) (0.0240) (0.0414) (0.0394)
Estimated yrs. -0.0221∗ 0.000705 0.0214∗∗∗ -0.0221∗ 0.000698 0.0214∗∗∗
of schooling (0.0106) (0.00804) (0.00636) (0.0106) (0.00800) (0.00633)
Student -0.0192 -0.143∗ 0.152∗ -0.0215 -0.139∗ 0.151∗
continued on following page . . .
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. . . continued from previous page
Multinomial Logit
Dependent variable = Participation Type
Model 4 Model 5
None Alone In person None Alone In person
(0.0475) (0.0700) (0.0692) (0.0474) (0.0695) (0.0698)
Low income 0.0491 0.00802 -0.0557 0.0524 0.00448 -0.0552
(0.0760) (0.0375) (0.0642) (0.0772) (0.0385) (0.0643)
High income 0.0370 -0.115∗ 0.0750 0.0360 -0.115∗ 0.0759
(0.0337) (0.0498) (0.0425) (0.0337) (0.0501) (0.0426)
Educaton Gini -3.848∗ 3.089∗∗∗ 0.759
(1.872) (0.854) (1.612)
Thiel index -1.187 1.220∗∗∗ -0.0321
of education (0.650) (0.287) (0.648)
Mean house- 0.0964 -0.0115 -0.0849 0.0766 0.0106 -0.0872
hold size (0.0579) (0.0526) (0.0690) (0.0557) (0.0513) (0.0707)
Mean yrs. -0.0106 -0.0223 0.0329 -0.0229 -0.0186 0.0414
of education (0.0343) (0.0219) (0.0360) (0.0320) (0.0189) (0.0344)
Mean 0.000660 0.000823 -0.00148 0.00100 0.000613 -0.00162
income (0.00107) (0.000667) (0.00100) (0.00105) (0.000676) (0.00105)
Number of -0.00107 0.00182 -0.000754 -0.000686 0.00113 -0.000440
households (0.00385) (0.00312) (0.00438) (0.00385) (0.00299) (0.00451)
N 682 682
Pseudo R-square 0.1117 0.1121
Standard errors in parentheses and clustered around neighborhood
Results adjusted for sampling weights
∗ p < 0.05, ∗∗ p < 0.01, ∗∗∗ p < 0.001
The effects of the other control variables are consistent with what might be expected and
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what was discussed in the previous section. Holding everything else constant, homeowners
are significantly less likely to drop out and more likely to participate in person, as are people
with more years of schooling. Conversely, those who work and those with high household
incomes are more likely to participate alone, ceteris paribus. Finally, with all else constant,
a 1 standard deviation increase in the number of years one has lived at his or her current
residence decreases the probability that the individual will choose not to participate at all by
4.8 percentage points, relative to the alternatives, in both models, and this is significant at
the 10% error level.
5.2.3 Individual differences
Recall from equation 3.4 on page 21 that our theory specifies an individual’s utility from
participating is made smaller by t̄|ci−c∗j |, or by the weighted absolute difference between that
person’s characteristics and the ideal characteristics of the community. Empirical tests of this
theory can be difficult, however, if there is no clear proxy for the community’s ideal and no
clear indication of exactly what characteristics are pivotal in developing a sense of identity.
This study assumes that individuals look to relative income and education levels to determine
into which social category their characteristics best fit, but finding a good instrument for the
ideal characteristics of a community is harder. Nevertheless, four general measurements were
settled upon to proxy for the ideal: the neighborhood mean, the neighborhood median, the
neighborhood maximum value, and the mean of those in the neighborhood who participate
in person. All four are calculated for income and estimated years of education. Then, the
absolute values of the differences between an individual’s income (or years of education) and
the mean, median, maximum, and participant mean income (or years of education) give
4 different approximations for the difference term ( |ci − c∗j | ) from the theoretical model.
The first 3 measures assume individuals infer how groups might be composed by looking at
their entire neighborhood, the 4th measure assumes that people know something about the
characteristics of those who all ready attend meetings in person.
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The multinomial regressions follow from equation 5.1, but use the absolute value of the in-
dividual’s distance from the ideal instead of traditional measurements of inequality. Each of
the eight regressions passes the Wald and LR tests for combining outcome categories, and IIA
assumptions hold under the Hausman and Small-Hsiao tests for nearly all of the models. The
IIA assumption does not hold under the Small-Hsiao test when omitting the option of partic-
ipating alone and using the absolute value of the difference between an individual’s estimated
years of education and the median years of education within the neighborhood. As before,
sampling weights and standard errors clustered by neighborhood are used. For simplicity, Ta-
ble 5.4 on page 59 gives the marginal effects of only the difference terms, our interest variables.
Full tables for each of the regressions appear beginning on page 85 in Appendix C.
Unfortunately, none of the approximations of distance from the ideal appears to be appropri-
ate. While the absolute value of the difference between individual income and the maximum
income in the neighborhood has a significant effect on whether a person will drop out, given
the other two choices, it is only significant at the 10% error level. There are at least four
possible explanations for why these models do not support the theory. First, the neighbor-
hood boundaries, as defined by the city of Missoula, may not correspond to the communities
with which people identify. It may be more likely that individuals compare themselves to
the larger population of Missoula or, alternately, those living on the same street, block, or
subdivision. Informal observations support this explanation. Frequently, respondents would
be surprised at the size of their neighborhood when showed a map of it. And despite being
shown that map, when respondents were asked to compare their own household the others in
their neighborhood, they would often begin by describing the other homes on the same street
or block. Furthermore, only 32% of respondents said they knew their neighborhood’s name,
and of those who said they knew the name, only 63% gave the correct name. Second, there
may be a behavioral asymmetry between people below the ideal and those above it. Since
we take the absolute value of the distance from the ideal, the model does not differentiate
between these two groups, and opposite behavior between them would bias the estimates.
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Another possibility is that the mean, median, and maximum do not capture the set of ideal
characteristics referred to in the theoretical model. Finally, of course, the results in Table 5.4
may not support the theory because the theory simply may be incorrect. Based on the results
in Tables 5.2 and 5.3, however, measurement error seems a more likely explanation.
Future research might look for smaller and more natural spatial divisions with which people
might identify, or it might stratify on cities or towns within a region, rather than neighbor-
hoods within a single city. Additionally, future studies should look for more evidence about
what a community’s ideal set of characteristics is. Asking about who respondents consider to
be leaders in their community, for example, could provide valuable insight into how people
identify as members of a civic body and how that influences patterns of participation.
Table 5.4: Marginal effects of difference terms on participation type
Dependent variable = Participation type Pseudo
Model Variable None Alone In Person R-square
6a Abs (individual inc. – mean -0.000432 0.000184 0.000248 0.1104
neighborhood inc.) (0.000340) (0.000330) (0.000369)
6b Abs (individual ed. – mean -0.00343 0.00450 -0.00107 0.1096
neighborhood ed.) (0.00891) (0.0112) (0.00991)
7a Abs (individual inc. – median -0.000444 0.000179 0.000266 0.1105
neighborhood inc.) (0.000331) (0.000390) (0.000375)
7b Abs (individual ed. - median -0.00213 0.0000562 0.00207 0.1095
neighborhood ed.) (0.00899) (0.0104) (0.00840)
8a Abs (individual inc. – maximum -0.000164* 0.000111 0.0000528 0.1105
neighborhood inc.) (0.0000831) (0.000116) (0.0000910)
8b Abs (individual ed. – maximum -0.00213 0.0000562 0.00207 0.1095
neighborhood ed.) (0.00899) (0.0104) (0.00840)
9a Abs (individual inc. — mean inc. -0.000225 0.000385 -0.000160 0.1103
of neighborhood participants) (0.000254) (0.000285) (0.000357)
9b Abs (individual ed. – mean ed. -0.00289 0.00895 -0.00606 0.1100
of neighborhood participants) (0.00940) (0.0116) (0.00872)
Standard errors in parentheses and clustered around neighborhood
Results adjusted for sampling weights
* p < 0.05, ** p < 0.01, *** p < 0.001
Chapter 6
Conclusion
This study began by adapting Akerlof and Kranton’s identity-augmented utility model to
explain how community-level heterogeneity and individual deviation from the ideal charac-
teristics of one’s social group can lead to decreased participation in local government and
community development activities. The theory predicted that the further a person’s charac-
teristics are from the ideal—regardless of whether the characteristics are above or below the
ideal—the smaller the benefits from participation and the less likely that person will be to
participate. Furthermore, as the distribution of individual characteristics within a commu-
nity gets wider, overall participation will drop from both sides of the distribution. The theory
also predicted, however, that the negative effects of participation can be mitigated when civic
institutions become more responsive to the input of constituents.
To test the implications of the theoretical model, data were gathered from over 680 households
in the city of Missoula, Montana between July 2006 and January 2007. Respondents answered
questions about socioeconomic status, participation behavior, perceptions about their relative
socioeconomic position, as well as their political attitudes. Responses to questions on income
and educational attainment were used to calculate inequality measurements for income and
60
CHAPTER 6. CONCLUSION 61
education within each of the 17 neighborhoods defined by the city.
Based on their responses to questions about participation history, respondents were cate-
gorized as either not participating at all, participating alone, or participating personally in
groups. Next, we informally adapted the theoretical model to account for the additional op-
tion of participating alone and predicted that inequality could increase overall participation
while still decreasing group participation, given this new category. Using a multinomial logit
model and numerous estimates of wealth and educational inequality, we found that increases
in inequality decrease the probability that people will drop out and increases the probabil-
ity that they will participate alone. This effect was especially pronounced under educational
inequality. To gain deeper understanding of this effect, subsequent research should aim to
formalize the theoretical model of how inequality influences participation under a 3rd option
of participating alone, which is increasingly available given the predominance of electronic
media and communication.
In some respects, the fact that educational inequality has a stronger impact on civic partici-
pation than income inequality is encouraging, since the policy implication is that governments
can stimulate civic participation by directing more resources toward education and targeting
those who traditionally receive the least amount of schooling. Such a program is underway, for
example, in Mexico, where the government subsidizes girls’ education more than boys’ (who
already are more likely to stay in school) under the PROGRESA program. Indeed, while
staggeringly difficult, promoting universal education is less daunting a task than equalizing
wages across all members of a population.
Tests of the effect of individual distance from community ideals were inconclusive, although
the possible reasons for this offer some direction for ensuing research. Future studies should
carefully consider other spatial references to which individuals may look when developing a
sense of identity as members of a social or political group. These references could be broader,
such as cities across a region, or they could be narrower, such as subdivisions, blocks, or
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streets within a city. Furthermore, additional attention should be paid to how people might
conceive of community ideals and how social scientists might measure or proxy for those
ideals. An obvious place to begin would be a thorough examination of elected leaders within
communities. This could occur directly, by surveying leaders, or indirectly, by asking citizens
about their conceptions of what qualities a leader should have.
Finally, an interesting implication of the theoretical model that did not get explored regards
the way increased responsiveness of civic institutions to political voice might assuage the
negative effects of inequality on participation. At a time when so many feel disenfranchised
from the political decision making process, this question may become increasingly relevant to
citizens and policy makers, alike.
Appendix A
The Survey
A.1 Survey design
A.1.1 Questionnaire development
The objective of the questionnaire was to profile the patterns of civic engagement, attitudes,
and basic demographic information of its respondents. To facilitate comparison, questions
regarding respondents’ participation are identical to those in the earlier Citizen Participa-
tion Survey of Missoula, Montana, a telephone survey commissioned by the Missoula Local
Government Study Commission and conducted by the Behavior Research Center (2005).1 In
Section 4, question 7 on trust, which Uslaner and Brown (2005) describes as “standard” and
indicative of “. . . a worldview stressing optimism and a sense of control: [that] the world is
a good place . . . ” [p. 871], comes from the General Social Survey (Davis et al., 2002). De-
mographic questions generally followed the format of the US Census, although we included 2
additional categories for the question regarding marital status to incorporate individuals who
1Specifically, the questions taken from the Behavior Research Center were Section 2, question 5 (a – c) and
Section 3, question 4 (a). In the case of the latter, the filter and the follow-up were the author’s additions.
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were engaged and individuals in non-married partnerships. The political scale and associ-
ated questions on the last page were adapted from an election survey developed by American
National Election Studies (2000).
The remaining questions are original. In composing and revising the questionnaire, we tried
to account for all possible ways respondents might answer questions, and we paid particular
attention to using neutral language and filters where appropriate. Teams of 2 enumerators
first piloted the questionnaire on 9 subjects in order to identify logical inconsistencies, sources
of linguistic confusion, omitted responses, and sources of respondents’ negative emotional
reactions (i.e., shame for lack of participation). During this pilot, respondents were asked to
describe how they interpreted each question after it was asked and were encouraged to suggest
ways to improve or clarify the question. Following extensive revision, a second pilot surveyed
9 new respondents. Objectives were similar to those of the first pilot, but respondents did not
generally have the opportunity to offer feedback until the end of the session. After another
round of revisions, we conducted a third pilot of the survey, revised accordingly, and settled
on a final version. During the piloting stage, respondents were selected from friends, family,
acquaintances, and colleagues. The final version of the questionnaire appears on page 65.
A.1.2 Sampling Method
The survey followed a stratified random sample, where the strata were a census of 17 neigh-
borhoods in the city of Missoula. Within each stratum, 40 households were randomly selected.
The randomized sampling followed the steps below:
1. Overlaying a map of each neighborhood with a grid, blacking out squares on the grid
representing areas without residences2, and numbering remaining squares on the grid.
2Satellite images from http://maps.google.com/ helped distinguish residential areas from commercial or
non-populated areas.
A.2. THE QUESTIONNAIRE 65
2. Using the random-number generator on Stata Statistical Software to select 50 of the
remaining squares.3
3. Starting at the selected point, enumerators used coin-flips to determine the side of the
street and direction they would work, wrapping around dead ends if necessary, until
finding a willing respondent. 4
A.1.3 The Interview
Enumerators worked in teams of 2 for safety and support. Each enumerator took an online
course and assessment in the ethical treatment of human subjects, hosted by The University
of Montana Institutional Review Board. Accordingly, their primary responsibility was to
insure that respondents were informed of their rights and the nature of the survey before
giving their consent to take it. After gaining informed consent, 1 enumerated asked questions
and recorded answers, and the other handed the respondent maps and supplementary cards.
The entire survey took about 15 minutes, although interview times ranged from 10 minutes
to almost an hour. The enumerators estimated a 30% – 45% response rate, although we
neglected to formally record this. Of those who agreed to take the survey, approximately 5%
– 7.5% stopped it early, almost exclusively due to an unwillingness to share information about
household income.
A.2 The Questionnaire
The questionnaire appears on the next page. Enumerators read the introduction to every
respondent and checked for understanding. They read text in bold face aloud, and directions
3The additional 10 squares accounted for the possibility that not every square would yield a respondent.
4For the case of apartment buildings, coin-flips would be used to determine the floor to be surveyed.
Enumerators proceeded, knocking on every door (save for those prohibiting solicitation)
A.2. THE QUESTIONNAIRE 66
are in all capital letters. Certain questions refer to cards that begin on page 75. Each card
has a number referring to the section and number of the question to which it corresponds.
Missoula Participation Survey
Jennifer Alix-Garcia & Benjamin Harris
Department of Economics
University of Montana
Your household was randomly selected to help in a University of
Montana student thesis about how inequality and people’s sense
of identity with some groups, but not others, influences their de-
cision to participate in local government. The survey has no com-
mercial value, and will take less than 15 minutes. Your identity
will remain entirely anonymous, and you may choose to stop the
survey at any point. This survey is approved by the University
of Montana, and its results will be summarized and available at
the U of M Mansfield Library and Department of Economics by
fall, 2007.
Summer, 2006
A.2. THE QUESTIONNAIRE 67
Missoula Participation Survey
Neighborhood Code:
Address:
Surveyor Code:
Date:
Survey Number:
Time:
1 Demographics
Instructions. First, I am going to ask you some basic questions about you and your house-
hold. Please answer to the best of your knowledge and make educated guesses if necessary.
1. How many years have you lived in Missoula? IF LESS THAN A YEAR, CODE < 1.
2. How many years have you lived in your current residence? IF LESS THAN A YEAR,
CODE < 1.
3. Do you rent your home, or do you own it?
1 Rent 2 Own
4. GENDER:
1 Male 2 Female
5. How old are you?
6. Please look at this card and tell me the number corresponding to the highest degree
or level of schooling you have completed. IF ANSWER < 6 =⇒ Q.8.
7. Are you currently a college student?
1 Yes 2 No
8. Have you been employed for pay in the past 6 months?
1 Yes 2 No =⇒ Q. 10
9. Please look at this card and tell me the number corresponding to your average work
week. THIS QUESTION REFERS TO THE PAST 6 MONTHS.
10. Please look at this card and tell me the number of the response that best describes
your marital status.
11. How many people live in your household?
12. How many of these people are 18 or over? THOSE OVER 18 YEARS OF AGE ARE
CONSIDERED ADULTS.
2
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13. IF THERE ARE CHILDREN IN THE HOUSEHOLD: How many of the children living in
the household are under 5 years old?
14. IF NO OTHER ADULTS LIVE IN THE HOUSEHOLD =⇒ Q.15. FOR THE FIRST OTHER
ADULT IN THE HOUSEHOLD, COMPLETE QUESTIONS a-h. FOR SUBSEQUENT OTHER
ADULTS, PLEASE ATTACH SUPPLEMENTARY QUESTIONS.
(a) What is his/her gender?
1 Male 2 Female
(b) What is his/her age?
(c) Please look at this card and tell me the number corresponding to the highest de-
gree or level of schooling this person has completed.
IF ANSWER < 6 =⇒ e.
(d) Is this person currently a college student?
1 Yes 2 No
(e) Has this person been employed for pay in the past 6 months?
1 Yes 2 No =⇒ Q. g
(f) Please look at this card and tell me the number corresponding to his/her average
work week. THIS QUESTION REFERS TO THE PAST 6 MONTHS.
(g) Please look at this card and tell me the number of the response that best de-
scribes this person’s marital status.
15. Please look at this card and tell me the number of the income group that in-
cludes your household’s total before-tax income in 2005. THIS FIGURE INCLUDES
SALARIES, WAGES, PENSIONS, DIVIDENDS, INTEREST, AND ALL OTHER INCOME
OF ALL THE ADULTS IN THE HOUSEHOLD. IF RESPONDENT SAYS “DON’T KNOW”,
PROBE WITH “WHAT WOULD BE YOUR BEST ESTIMATE?”
3
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2 Community Participation
Instructions. Fewer than half of eligible Americans vote in Presidential elections, and par-
ticipation in other democratic activities is also infrequent. I am going to ask you some
questions about how you and your household participate in your community, but I want
to emphasize that there is no right or wrong answer to a question.
1. Are you registered to vote in the US?
1 Yes 2 No =⇒ Q. 5
2. Did you vote in the last presidential elections?
1 Yes 2 No 9 Don’t know/Can’t
remember
3. Are you registered to vote in Missoula?
1 Yes 2 No =⇒ Q. 5
4. Did you vote in last November’s election for mayor?
1 Yes 2 No 9 Don’t know/Can’t
remember
5. The next set of questions concerns your household’s participation over the past 12
months in various local government meetings. By participation, I mean watching
a recording of the meeting on MCAT (our local public access television station),
reading a transcript of the meeting, or actually attending in person. All three of
these activities count equally as participating. I will ask you about a few different
kinds of meetings.
(a) City Council meetings?
1 Yes =⇒ 1 In person 2 MCAT 3 Read transcript
2 No
(b) City Boards or Commissions?
1 Yes =⇒ 1 In person 2 MCAT 3 Read transcript
2 No
(c) Homeowners’ Association Meetings?
1 Yes =⇒ 1 In person 2 MCAT 3 Read transcript
2 No
6. In the last 12 months, have you (or any other adult) in your household attended a
school board meeting?
1 Yes 2 No
7. Are there any other meetings related to local planning that you (or any other adult)
in your household attended in the last 12 months?
1 Yes 2 No
4
A.2. THE QUESTIONNAIRE 70
8. In the last 12 months, have you (or any other adult) in your household contacted a
public official (LOCAL OR OTHERWISE) to register a complaint or comment?
1 Yes 2 No
9. In the last 12 months, have you (or any other adult) in your household written a
letter to the editor of a newspaper?
1 Yes 2 No
10. In the last 12 months, have you (or any other adult) in your household volunteered
for any political activities (local or otherwise)?
1 Yes 2 No
11. In the last 12 months, have you (or any other adult) in your household participated
in any other volunteer activities, such as at the Food Bank, River Cleanups, or
through your religious community?
1 Yes 2 No
(a) If you answered “yes” to the previous question, please list the volunteer activity
or activities:
5
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3 Neighborhood participation
Instructions. In 1999, the city of Missoula established 17 neighborhood councils. They cover
the entire city boundaries, and their purpose is to meet and report local issues and give
local advice to the city council. Neighborhood councils are not the same as homeowners’
associations. Now, to follow up after the previous section, I am going to ask you some
questions about your neighborhood council
1. Your neighborhood council meets under a specific name. Do you happen to know
what that name is?
1 Yes:
2 No
(a) DID THE RESPONDENT GIVE THE CORRECT NEIGHBORHOOD COUNCIL NAME?
1 Yes 2 No 9 Not applicable
2. Do you know how to find out when and where your next neighborhood council
meeting will be held?
1 Yes =⇒ Q. 3 2 No
(a) Is this because you have no desire to, or because you’re not sure how find out
about your neighborhood council?
1 No desire 2 Not sure where to look
3. To the best of your knowledge, have you or anyone in your household ever been
contacted by your neighborhood council, either to invite you to an upcoming meeting
or to inform you about important issues from recent meetings?
1 Yes 2 No =⇒ Q. 4
(a) How were you contacted? CHOOSE ALL THAT APPLY.
1 Mail 2 Newsletters 3 Telephone 4 In person
4. Within the last 12 months, have you known about an upcoming neighborhood coun-
cil meeting?
1 Yes 2 No =⇒ Section 4
(a) Did you (or any of the other adults in your household) participate, either by
watching MCAT, reading a transcript, or attending in person?
1 Yes =⇒ 1 In person 2 MCAT 3 Read transcript
2 No
(b) If you knew about a meeting within the last 12 months, but chose not to par-
ticipate, why didn’t you? Please look at this card and tell me the number or
numbers that best describe why you did not go. CHOOSE ALL THAT APPLY.
6
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4 Attitudes
Instructions. Finally, I am going to ask you questions about both your attitudes and how
you perceive yourself in relation to others. Do not worry if you don’t know exactly where
you stand – we are interested in your impressions rather than your ability to exactly assess
your position in relation to your neighbors.
SHOW THE RESPONDENT THE MAP OF HIS OR HER NEIGHBORHOOD FOR REFER-
ENCE TO QUESTIONS 1–4.
1. Compared to the rest of the households in your neighborhood, do you feel your
household’s income is far above average, above average, average, below average, or
far below average?
Far below Below average Average Above average Far above
average average
1 2 3 4 5
2. Compared to the rest of the households in your neighborhood, do you feel the edu-
cation of the adults in your household is far above average, above average, average,
below average, or far below average?
Far below Below average Average Above average Far above
average average
1 2 3 4 5
3. Compared to the rest of the households in the city of Missoula, do you feel your
household’s income is far above average, above average, average, below average, or
far below average?
Far below Below average Average Above average Far above
average average
1 2 3 4 5
4. Compared to the rest of the households in the city of Missoula, do you feel the edu-
cation of the adults in your household is far above average, above average, average,
below average, or far below average?
Far below Below average Average Above average Far above
average average
1 2 3 4 5
7
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5. We hear a lot of talk these days about liberals and conservatives. Please look at this
list of political figures and organizations and a 7-point scale on which the political
views that people might hold are arranged from extremely liberal (1) to extremely
conservative (7). I’ll need you to rate these people and organizations on that scale,
and ”don’t know” is an option if you’re unfamiliar with any or all of them.
(a) Where would you place .... on this scale?
Extremely Extremely Don’t
Liberal Conservative know
George Bush
1 2 3 4 5 6 7 9
Brian
Schweitzer 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 9
Max
Baucus 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 9
Conrad
Burns 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 9
Republican
Party 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 9
Democratic
Party 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 9
(b) Where would you place yourself on this scale (give a number), or have you not thought about
this?
9 Have not thought about it=⇒(d)
(c) IF THE RESPONDENT ANSWERED # 4 If you had to choose would you consider yourself a liberal
or a conservative?
1 Liberal =⇒ 6 2 Conservative =⇒ 6
(d) IF THE RESPONDENT HAS NOT THOUGHT ABOUT IT: If you had to choose would you consider
yourself a liberal or a conservative?
1 Liberal 2 Conservative
6. Regardless of your voting history, do you generally think of yourself as a Republican,
a Democrat, an Independent, or do you not identify with a political party?
1 Republican 2 Democrat 3 Independent 4 Do not identify
with a political
party
7. Generally speaking, do you believe that:
1 Most people can be trusted 2 You cannot be too careful in dealing with
people
THE END: THANK YOU VERY MUCH FOR PARTICIPATING IN THIS
SURVEY
8
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Education (1.6)
1. No schooling attended
2. Junior high school (8th grade)
3. High school (12th grade) or GED
4. Trade school or apprenticeship (includes military service)
5. Associate Degree
6. Bachelor’s Degree
7. Post-baccalaureate
8. Master’s Degree
9. Professional Degree (e.g., MD, DDS, DVM, LLB, JD)
10. Doctorate Degree
Average Number of Hours Worked in a Week (1.9)
1. Less than 10
2. 11–20
3. 21–30
4. 31–40
5. More than 40
Marital Status (1.10)
1. Single
2. Engaged
3. Married
4. Widowed
5. Divorced
6. In a long-term non-married partnership
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Income (1.15)
1. None or less than $2,999
2. $3,000–$4,999
3. $5,000–$6,999
4. $7,000–$8,999
5. $9,000–$10,999
6. $11,000–$12,999
7. $13,000–$14,999
8. $15,000–$16,999
9. $17,000–$19,999
10. $20,000–$21,999
11. $22,000–$24,999
12. $25,000–$29,999
13. $30,000–$34,999
14. $35,000–$39,999
15. $40,000–$44,999
16. $45,000–$49,999
17. $50,000–$59,999
18. $60,000–$69,999
19. $70,000–$79,999
20. $80,000–$89,999
21. $90,000–$104,999
22. $105,000–$119,999
23. $120,000 and above
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Reasons for Not Attending Neighborhood Council (3.4.b)
1. Cost of childcare
2. Cost of transportation
3. Lack of transportation
4. Lack of time or scheduling conflict
5. Did not feel like it was important
6. Did not feel like I would make a difference
7. Did not feel welcome
8. Other
Political Scale and List (4.5.a)
Extremely Extremely
Liberal Conservative
1 2 3 4 5 6 7
1. Bush
2. Schewitzer
3. Baucus
4. Burns
5. National Republican Party
6. National Democratic Party
Appendix B
Neighborhoods
In 1996, the City of Missoula voted to establish 17 Neighborhood Councils. Collectively, the
councils cover the entire boundaries of the city, as shown in Figure B.1 on page 80. Neighbor-
hood Councils are fora for closer communication between the City Council and the citizenry.
As such, they serve in a primarily advisory capacity with little legal authority. Neverthe-
less, some councils have had considerable influence over public planning.1 They also play
an important role in nurturing community development projects—particularly beautification
projects.
Throughout this study, we refer to the neighborhoods alternately by their city-designated
names and by the arbitrary numbers assigned to them during the survey and data entry
stages of the project. The number system, used mostly in tables to save space, is as follows:
1. Grant Creek
2. Westside
1For example, the Grant Creek Neighborhood Council spearheaded opposition to an existing gas station’s
proposal to begin offering electronic gambling machines. In 1995, the gas station’s plans were withdrawn,
specifically on account of the public outcry (Merriam, December 8, 2005).
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3. Emma Dickenson / Orchard Homes
4. Franklin to the Fort
5. Southgate Triangle
6. South 39th Street
7. Miller Creek
8. Moose Can Gully
9. Farviews / Pattee Canyon
10. Lewis & Clark
11. Rose Park
12. Riverfront
13. University District
14. Heart of Missoula
15. Lower Rattlesnake
16. Upper Rattlesnake
17. Northside
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Upper Rattlesnake
Westside
Grant Creek
Northside
None
Lower Rattlesnake
Franklin to the Fort
None
Rose Park
Miller Creek
University District
Moose Can Gully
Riverfront
Lewis & ClarkSouthgate Triangle
Farviews / Pattee Canyon
Heart of Missoula
South 39th Street
None
Emma Dickinson / Orchard Homes
None
None
Future / Proposed
Miller Creek
Mullan Area (Proposed)
Northside
Future / Proposed
None
Miller Creek
Future / Proposed
None
Mullan Area (Proposed)
Future / Proposed
Future / Proposed
None
None
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Appendix C
Regression Tables
Table C.1: Coefficients for participation on income inequality
Dependent variable = Participation type
Model 1 Model 2 Model 3
None Alone None Alone None Alone
Female -0.341∗ -0.116 -0.342∗ -0.116 -0.344∗ -0.117
(0.164) (0.195) (0.165) (0.195) (0.164) (0.196)
Age -0.130∗∗∗ -0.0252 -0.130∗∗∗ -0.0251 -0.134∗∗∗ -0.0261
(0.0376) (0.0370) (0.0376) (0.0370) (0.0371) (0.0366)
Age2 0.00120∗∗∗ 0.000235 0.00120∗∗∗ 0.000235 0.00124∗∗∗ 0.000246
(0.000361) (0.000366) (0.000361) (0.000366) (0.000355) (0.000362)
Homeowner -1.213∗∗ -0.657 -1.213∗∗ -0.657 -1.191∗∗ -0.655
(0.381) (0.337) (0.381) (0.337) (0.377) (0.335)
Years at -0.0241∗ -0.00715 -0.0240∗ -0.00715 -0.0237∗ -0.00731
current res. (0.0105) (0.0111) (0.0105) (0.0111) (0.0103) (0.0110)
Working -0.119 0.509 -0.120 0.509 -0.107 0.511
continued on following page . . .
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. . . continued from previous page
Dependent variable = Participation type
Model 1 Model 2 Model 3
None Alone None Alone None Alone
(0.305) (0.304) (0.305) (0.304) (0.300) (0.302)
Married 0.564∗ 0.121 0.564∗ 0.121 0.579∗ 0.125
(0.274) (0.303) (0.274) (0.303) (0.274) (0.302)
Household -0.309 -0.0445 -0.309 -0.0445 -0.313 -0.0458
size (0.209) (0.233) (0.209) (0.233) (0.206) (0.234)
Number of -0.132 -0.264 -0.132 -0.264 -0.124 -0.265
children (0.173) (0.245) (0.173) (0.245) (0.170) (0.245)
Estimated yrs. -0.149∗∗ -0.0687∗ -0.149∗∗ -0.0686∗ -0.151∗∗ -0.0686∗
of education (0.0555) (0.0312) (0.0555) (0.0312) (0.0555) (0.0311)
Student -0.493 -0.953∗ -0.494 -0.952∗ -0.520 -0.954∗
(0.355) (0.432) (0.355) (0.432) (0.356) (0.431)
Low income 0.467 0.197 0.466 0.198 0.439 0.195
(0.488) (0.262) (0.487) (0.262) (0.487) (0.258)
High income -0.130 -0.597∗ -0.130 -0.597∗ -0.124 -0.596∗
(0.206) (0.268) (0.206) (0.268) (0.208) (0.269)
Lower-bound -3.408∗∗ -0.175
Income Gini (1.053) (1.053)
Upper-bound -3.423∗∗ -0.197
income Gini (1.060) (1.049)
Thiel index -1.398 0.0143
of income (0.780) (0.432)
Mean house- 0.405 0.157 0.420 0.156 0.516 0.197
hold size (0.521) (0.348) (0.520) (0.347) (0.516) (0.341)
continued on following page . . .
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Dependent variable = Participation type
Model 1 Model 2 Model 3
None Alone None Alone None Alone
Mean yrs. -0.497∗∗ -0.121 -0.491∗∗ -0.122 -0.491∗ -0.102
of education (0.178) (0.163) (0.177) (0.162) (0.207) (0.163)
Mean 0.0178∗ 0.00799 0.0177∗ 0.00803 0.0153 0.00704
income (0.00858) (0.00497) (0.00855) (0.00494) (0.00870) (0.00432)
Number of -0.000929 0.0162 -0.000638 0.0163 -0.0120 0.0144
households (0.0240) (0.0243) (0.0241) (0.0243) (0.0250) (0.0222)
Constant 13.49∗∗∗ 2.901 13.39∗∗∗ 2.917 12.59∗∗∗ 2.547
(3.196) (2.482) (3.182) (2.466) (3.609) (2.453)
N 682 682 682
Pseudo R-square 0.1131 0.1131 0.1117
Standard errors in parentheses and clustered around neighborhood
Results adjusted for sampling weights
∗ p < 0.05, ∗∗ p < 0.01, ∗∗∗ p < 0.001
Table C.2: Coefficients for participation on education inequality
Dependent variable = Participation type
Model 4 Model 5
None Alone None Alone
Female -0.359∗ -0.117 -0.352∗ -0.116
(0.165) (0.197) (0.162) (0.197)
Age -0.142∗∗∗ -0.0234 -0.141∗∗∗ -0.0238
(0.0370) (0.0352) (0.0371) (0.0354)
Age2 0.00133∗∗∗ 0.000220 0.00132∗∗∗ 0.000224
(0.000353) (0.000352) (0.000353) (0.000352)
Homeowner -1.188∗∗ -0.657∗ -1.183∗∗ -0.656∗
continued on following page . . .
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Dependent variable = Participation type
Model 4 Model 5
None Alone None Alone
(0.387) (0.332) (0.386) (0.331)
Years at -0.0256∗ -0.00665 -0.0253∗ -0.00634
current res. (0.0109) (0.0110) (0.0109) (0.0109)
Working -0.114 0.510 -0.105 0.507
(0.294) (0.302) (0.293) (0.300)
Married 0.619∗ 0.123 0.618∗ 0.120
(0.266) (0.302) (0.268) (0.300)
Household -0.332 -0.0421 -0.330 -0.0415
size (0.215) (0.233) (0.213) (0.233)
Number of -0.116 -0.265 -0.116 -0.265
children (0.172) (0.246) (0.171) (0.246)
Estimated yrs. -0.157∗∗ -0.0671∗ -0.156∗∗ -0.0671∗
of education (0.0587) (0.0303) (0.0583) (0.0303)
Student -0.529 -0.943∗ -0.539 -0.932∗
(0.353) (0.429) (0.357) (0.431)
Low income 0.369 0.206 0.379 0.193
(0.474) (0.254) (0.476) (0.255)
High income -0.0843 -0.606∗ -0.0914 -0.610∗
(0.212) (0.273) (0.211) (0.276)
Education -17.64 7.274
Gini (12.35) (5.604)
Thiel index -4.578 3.957
of education (4.670) (2.435)
continued on following page . . .
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Dependent variable = Participation type
Model 4 Model 5
None Alone None Alone
Mean House- 0.655 0.239 0.585 0.316
hold size (0.433) (0.358) (0.430) (0.364)
Mean yrs. -0.149 -0.177 -0.224 -0.193
of education (0.234) (0.155) (0.221) (0.144)
Mean 0.00741 0.00740 0.00921 0.00719
income (0.00691) (0.00420) (0.00699) (0.00453)
Number of -0.00177 0.00819 -0.00128 0.00498
households (0.0273) (0.0210) (0.0280) (0.0212)
Constant 9.108∗∗ 2.798 9.283∗∗ 2.956
(3.434) (2.076) (3.405) (1.918)
N 682 682
Pseudo R-square 0.1117 0.1121
Standard errors in parentheses and clustered around neighborhood
Results adjusted for sampling weights
∗ p < 0.05, ∗∗ p < 0.01, ∗∗∗ p < 0.001
Table C.3: Coefficients of participation on difference from mean
Multinomial Logit: base outcome is participating in person
Dependent variable = Participation type
Model 6a Model 6b
None Alone None Alone
Female -0.335∗ -0.118 -0.352∗ -0.118
(0.162) (0.189) (0.162) (0.195)
Age -0.141∗∗∗ -0.0258 -0.138∗∗∗ -0.0251
(0.0371) (0.0367) (0.0361) (0.0372)
continued on following page . . .
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Multinomial Logit: base outcome is participating in person
Dependent variable = Participation type
Model 6a Model 6b
None Alone None Alone
Age2 0.00132∗∗∗ 0.000244 0.00129∗∗∗ 0.000234
(0.000352) (0.000364) (0.000342) (0.000371)
Homeowner -1.191∗∗ -0.659∗ -1.175∗∗ -0.657∗
(0.378) (0.333) (0.375) (0.333)
Years at -0.0241∗ -0.00733 -0.0240∗ -0.00728
current res. (0.0104) (0.0112) (0.0102) (0.0111)
Working -0.0959 0.519 -0.120 0.510
(0.290) (0.304) (0.292) (0.301)
Married 0.615∗ 0.129 0.593∗ 0.131
(0.274) (0.308) (0.272) (0.311)
Household -0.324 -0.0471 -0.317 -0.0465
size (0.209) (0.236) (0.206) (0.234)
Number of -0.120 -0.262 -0.121 -0.264
children (0.169) (0.245) (0.169) (0.246)
Estimated yrs. -0.154∗∗ -0.0688∗ -0.153∗∗ -0.0729∗
of education (0.0563) (0.0304) (0.0516) (0.0298)
Student -0.518 -0.961∗ -0.503 -0.960∗
(0.351) (0.437) (0.348) (0.434)
Low income 0.431 0.206 0.386 0.198
(0.476) (0.255) (0.466) (0.251)
High income -0.0415 -0.594∗ -0.0870 -0.595∗
(0.205) (0.244) (0.212) (0.270)
Abs(income - mean) -0.00251 -0.000232
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Multinomial Logit: base outcome is participating in person
Dependent variable = Participation type
Model 6a Model 6b
None Alone None Alone
(0.00226) (0.00198)
Abs(education - mean) -0.00999 0.0176
(0.0539) (0.0612)
Mean 0.0112 0.00705 0.00927 0.00694
income (0.00880) (0.00454) (0.00803) (0.00364)
Mean yrs. -0.343 -0.107 -0.326 -0.107
of education (0.196) (0.153) (0.203) (0.151)
Mean house- 0.682 0.200 0.697 0.205
size (0.501) (0.344) (0.499) (0.348)
Number of -0.0112 0.0129 -0.0117 0.0123
households (0.0274) (0.0218) (0.0280) (0.0219)
Constant 10.01∗∗ 2.632 9.762∗∗ 2.639
(3.396) (2.250) (3.465) (2.242)
N 682 682
Pseudo R-square 0.1104 0.1096
Standard errors in parentheses and clustered around neighborhood
Results adjusted for sampling weights
∗ p < 0.05, ∗∗ p < 0.01, ∗∗∗ p < 0.001
APPENDIX C. REGRESSION TABLES 88
Table C.4: Coefficients of participation on difference from
median
Multinomial Logit: base outcome is participating in person
Dependent variable = Participation type
Model 7a Model 7b
None Alone None Alone
Female -0.335∗ -0.117 -0.351∗ -0.119
(0.161) (0.187) (0.163) (0.196)
Age -0.139∗∗∗ -0.0255 -0.139∗∗∗ -0.0263
(0.0369) (0.0367) (0.0360) (0.0366)
Age2 0.00130∗∗∗ 0.000242 0.00129∗∗∗ 0.000247
(0.000351) (0.000363) (0.000340) (0.000364)
Homeowner -1.181∗∗ -0.659∗ -1.172∗∗ -0.658∗
(0.376) (0.334) (0.376) (0.334)
Years at -0.0244∗ -0.00742 -0.0240∗ -0.00732
current res. (0.0101) (0.0114) (0.0101) (0.0112)
Working -0.0923 0.520 -0.118 0.514
(0.287) (0.303) (0.289) (0.301)
Married 0.622∗ 0.130 0.590∗ 0.122
(0.279) (0.308) (0.269) (0.312)
Household -0.320 -0.0476 -0.318 -0.0457
size (0.207) (0.236) (0.206) (0.234)
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Multinomial Logit: base outcome is participating in person
Dependent variable = Participation type
Model 7a Model 7b
None Alone None Alone
Number of -0.122 -0.261 -0.121 -0.264
Children (0.169) (0.245) (0.169) (0.245)
Estimated yrs. -0.153∗∗ -0.0688∗ -0.148∗∗ -0.0662∗
of education (0.0563) (0.0305) (0.0525) (0.0318)
Student -0.511 -0.958∗ -0.504 -0.962∗
(0.353) (0.439) (0.348) (0.435)
Low income 0.330 0.197 0.386 0.201
(0.451) (0.259) (0.464) (0.251)
High income 0.0862 -0.580∗ -0.0876 -0.594∗
(0.199) (0.234) (0.211) (0.270)
Abs(income - median) -0.00262 -0.000305
(0.00208) (0.00222)
Abs(education - median) -0.0151 -0.00655
(0.0501) (0.0530)
Mean 0.0108 0.00726 0.00923 0.00686
income (0.00863) (0.00462) (0.00803) (0.00360)
Mean yrs. -0.346 -0.108 -0.330 -0.108
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Multinomial Logit: base outcome is participating in person
Dependent variable = Participation type
Model 7a Model 7b
None Alone None Alone
of education (0.197) (0.155) (0.201) (0.153)
Mean house- 0.674 0.200 0.697 0.204
hold size (0.503) (0.343) (0.499) (0.348)
Number of -0.0113 0.0129 -0.0119 0.0124
households (0.0275) (0.0219) (0.0278) (0.0219)
Constant 10.07∗∗ 2.631 9.770∗∗ 2.636
(3.416) (2.296) (3.461) (2.240)
N 682 682
Pseudo R-square 0.1105 0.1095
Standard errors in parentheses and clustered around neighborhood
Results adjusted for sampling weights
∗ p < 0.05, ∗∗ p < 0.01, ∗∗∗ p < 0.001
Table C.5: Coefficients for participation on difference from maximum
Multinomial Logit: base outcome is participating in person
Dependent variable = Participation type
Model 8a Model 8b
None Alone None Alone
Female -0.358∗ -0.117 -0.351∗ -0.119
(0.163) (0.195) (0.163) (0.196)
Age -0.136∗∗∗ -0.0266 -0.139∗∗∗ -0.0263
continued on following page . . .
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Multinomial Logit: base outcome is participating in person
Dependent variable = Participation type
Model 8a Model 8b
None Alone None Alone
(0.0365) (0.0367) (0.0360) (0.0366)
Age2 0.00127∗∗∗ 0.000251 0.00129∗∗∗ 0.000247
(0.000347) (0.000364) (0.000340) (0.000364)
Homeowner -1.174∗∗ -0.657∗ -1.172∗∗ -0.658∗
(0.378) (0.334) (0.376) (0.334)
Years at -0.0243∗ -0.00734 -0.0240∗ -0.00732
current residence (0.0102) (0.0111) (0.0101) (0.0112)
Working -0.114 0.512 -0.118 0.514
(0.299) (0.301) (0.289) (0.301)
Married 0.584∗ 0.127 0.590∗ 0.122
(0.274) (0.304) (0.269) (0.312)
Household -0.318 -0.0462 -0.318 -0.0457
size (0.205) (0.234) (0.206) (0.234)
Number of -0.119 -0.265 -0.121 -0.264
children (0.169) (0.244) (0.169) (0.245)
Estimated yrs. -0.152∗∗ -0.0688∗ -0.148∗∗ -0.0662∗
of education (0.0550) (0.0307) (0.0525) (0.0318)
Student -0.530 -0.954∗ -0.504 -0.962∗
(0.352) (0.433) (0.348) (0.435)
Low income 0.428 0.189 0.386 0.201
(0.489) (0.259) (0.464) (0.251)
High income -0.168 -0.578∗ -0.0876 -0.594∗
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Multinomial Logit: base outcome is participating in person
Dependent variable = Participation type
Model 8a Model 8b
None Alone None Alone
(0.199) (0.253) (0.211) (0.270)
Abs(income - maximum) -0.000816 0.000176
(0.000468) (0.000610)
Abs(education - maximum) -0.0151 -0.00655
(0.0501) (0.0530)
Mean 0.0163∗ 0.00534 0.00923 0.00686
income (0.00811) (0.00561) (0.00803) (0.00360)
Mean yrs. -0.427∗ -0.0818 -0.330 -0.108
of education (0.211) (0.172) (0.201) (0.153)
Mean house- 0.669 0.212 0.697 0.204
hold size (0.462) (0.347) (0.499) (0.348)
Number of -0.0158 0.0138 -0.0119 0.0124
households (0.0281) (0.0223) (0.0278) (0.0219)
Constant 11.10∗∗ 2.282 9.770∗∗ 2.636
(3.696) (2.502) (3.461) (2.240)
N 682 682
Pseudo R-square 0.1105 0.1095
Standard errors in parentheses and clustered around neighborhood
Results adjusted for sampling weights
∗ p < 0.05, ∗∗ p < 0.01, ∗∗∗ p < 0.001
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Table C.6: Coefficients for participation on difference from mean of par-
ticipants
Multinomial Logit: base outcome is participating in person
Dependent variable = Participation type
Model 9a Model 9b
None Alone None Alone
Female -0.344∗ -0.131 -0.351∗ -0.114
(0.165) (0.191) (0.161) (0.194)
Age -0.139∗∗∗ -0.0239 -0.138∗∗∗ -0.0236
(0.0372) (0.0365) (0.0365) (0.0373)
Age2 0.00130∗∗∗ 0.000222 0.00128∗∗∗ 0.000219
(0.000353) (0.000363) (0.000347) (0.000372)
Homeowner -1.180∗∗ -0.649 -1.173∗∗ -0.648
(0.377) (0.333) (0.372) (0.333)
Years at -0.0240∗ -0.00722 -0.0241∗ -0.00735
current res. (0.0102) (0.0112) (0.0101) (0.0110)
Working -0.119 0.504 -0.117 0.514
(0.294) (0.304) (0.294) (0.298)
Married 0.599∗ 0.116 0.600∗ 0.140
(0.276) (0.307) (0.270) (0.311)
Household -0.318 -0.0423 -0.319 -0.0488
size (0.208) (0.235) (0.207) (0.234)
Number of -0.125 -0.267 -0.120 -0.264
children (0.169) (0.244) (0.170) (0.245)
Estimated yrs. -0.153∗∗ -0.0676∗ -0.157∗∗ -0.0726∗∗
of education (0.0553) (0.0297) (0.0556) (0.0272)
Student -0.506 -0.951∗ -0.500 -0.952∗
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Multinomial Logit: base outcome is participating in person
Dependent variable = Participation type
Model 9a Model 9b
None Alone None Alone
(0.347) (0.431) (0.347) (0.429)
Low income 0.389 0.165 0.385 0.198
(0.472) (0.250) (0.466) (0.250)
High income -0.0799 -0.609∗ -0.0866 -0.591∗
(0.213) (0.258) (0.214) (0.269)
Abs(income - participant) -0.000369 0.00173
(0.00192) (0.00189)
Abs(education - participant) 0.00836 0.0478
(0.0505) (0.0584)
Mean 0.00972 0.00478 0.00935 0.00648
income (0.00893) (0.00481) (0.00806) (0.00401)
Mean yrs. -0.333 -0.0979 -0.329 -0.109
of education (0.198) (0.153) (0.200) (0.150)
Mean house- 0.692 0.237 0.695 0.220
hold size (0.497) (0.331) (0.504) (0.349)
Number of -0.0123 0.0108 -0.0120 0.0125
households (0.0274) (0.0217) (0.0279) (0.0219)
Constant 9.865∗∗ 2.460 9.802∗∗ 2.534
(3.446) (2.312) (3.429) (2.254)
N 682 682
Pseudo R-square 0.1103 0.1100
Standard errors in parentheses and clustered around neighborhood
Results adjusted for sampling weights
∗ p < 0.05, ∗∗ p < 0.01, ∗∗∗ p < 0.001
Appendix D
STATA Code
# delimit;
clear;
cd "/Users/benjamincerf/Documents/Research Projects/In Progress/Master’s
Thesis-Heterogeneity & Participation/Output/Survey/Results/Stata Programs/
Analysis 2";
use "/Users/benjamincerf/Documents/Research Projects/In Progress/Master’s
Thesis-Heterogeneity & Participation/Output/Survey/Results/Stata Programs/
Analysis 2/MSLADATA1.dta";
capture log close;
log using "MSLA Analysis 4-20-07", replace text;
svyset, clear;
svyset _n [pweight = weight], strata(neighborhood);
drop if missyrs > age;
*************Cleanup;
replace political =0 if political == 2;
replace contact = 0 if contact == .;
replace editor = 0 if editor == .;
replace political = 0 if political == .;
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replace volunteer = 0 if volunteer ==.;
replace estincome = estincome/1000;
move estincome usregister;
drop cmeaninc csdinc;
replace neighborhoodsize = neighborhoodsize/100;
**************Making income estimates;
gen estincome = 0;
replace estincome=1499.5 if income==1;
replace estincome=3999.5 if income==2;
replace estincome=5999.5 if income==3;
replace estincome=7999.5 if income==4;
replace estincome=9999.5 if income==5;
replace estincome=11999.5 if income==6;
replace estincome=13999.5 if income==7;
replace estincome=15999.5 if income==8;
replace estincome=18499.5 if income==9;
replace estincome=20999.5 if income==10;
replace estincome=22499.5 if income==11;
replace estincome=27499.5 if income==12;
replace estincome=32499.5 if income==13;
replace estincome=37499.5 if income==14;
replace estincome=42499.5 if income==15;
replace estincome=47499.5 if income==16;
replace estincome=54999.5 if income==17;
replace estincome=64999.5 if income==18;
replace estincome=74999.5 if income==19;
replace estincome=84999.5 if income==20;
replace estincome=97499.5 if income==21;
replace estincome=112499.5 if income==22;
***Estimate of Income assuming perfect horizontal inequality;
gen estincome2=0;
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replace estincome2=3000 if income==2;
replace estincome2=5000 if income==3;
replace estincome2=7000 if income==4;
replace estincome2=9000 if income==5;
replace estincome2=11000 if income==6;
replace estincome2=13000 if income==7;
replace estincome2=15000 if income==8;
replace estincome2=17000 if income==9;
replace estincome2=20000 if income==10;
replace estincome2=22000 if income==11;
replace estincome2=25000 if income==12;
replace estincome2=30000 if income==13;
replace estincome2=35000 if income==14;
replace estincome2=40000 if income==15;
replace estincome2=45000 if income==16;
replace estincome2=50000 if income==17;
replace estincome2=60000 if income==18;
replace estincome2=70000 if income==19;
replace estincome2=80000 if income==20;
replace estincome2=90000 if income==21;
replace estincome2=105000 if income==22;
*Assigning 1 person from each bracket in each neighborhood
(where the obs in the bracket is >1) income at the high-end of
the bracket;
sort neighborhood income;
by neighborhood income: gen identifier=_n;
by neighborhood income: egen nsum=count(income);
by neighborhood income: replace estincome2=2999 if income==1 &
identifier==1 & nsum>1;
replace estincome2=4999 if income==2 & identifier==1 & nsum>1;
replace estincome2=6999 if income==3 & identifier==1 & nsum>1;
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replace estincome2=8999 if income==4 & identifier==1 & nsum>1;
replace estincome2=10999 if income==5 & identifier==1 & nsum>1;
replace estincome2=12999 if income==6 & identifier==1 & nsum>1;
replace estincome2=14999 if income==7 & identifier==1 & nsum>1;
replace estincome2=16999 if income==8 & identifier==1 & nsum>1;
replace estincome2=19999 if income==9 & identifier==1 & nsum>1;
replace estincome2=21999 if income==10 & identifier==1 & nsum>1;
replace estincome2=24999 if income==11 & identifier==1 & nsum>1;
replace estincome2=29999 if income==12 & identifier==1 & nsum>1;
replace estincome2=34999 if income==13 & identifier==1 & nsum>1;
replace estincome2=39999 if income==14 & identifier==1 & nsum>1;
replace estincome2=44999 if income==15 & identifier==1 & nsum>1;
replace estincome2=49999 if income==16 & identifier==1 & nsum>1;
replace estincome2=59999 if income==17 & identifier==1 & nsum>1;
replace estincome2=69999 if income==18 & identifier==1 & nsum>1;
replace estincome2=79999 if income==19 & identifier==1 & nsum>1;
replace estincome2=89999 if income==20 & identifier==1 & nsum>1;
replace estincome2=104999 if income==21 & identifier==1 & nsum>1;
replace estincome2=119999 if income==22 & identifier==1 & nsum>1;
drop identifier nsum;
****fitting the upper income bracket to a pareto distribution*****;
sort income;
by income: gen identifier=_n;
***assigned a random number to each of the 62 obs with inc>=120k
and used pareto dist. with alph=2;
replace estincome = 750000 if income == 23 & identifier == 10;
replace estincome = 610000 if income == 23 & identifier == 7;
replace estincome = 510000 if income == 23 & identifier == 38;
replace estincome = 450000 if income == 23 & identifier == 56;
replace estincome = 410000 if income == 23 & identifier == 33;
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replace estincome = 390000 if income == 23 & identifier == 11;
replace estincome = 370000 if income == 23 & identifier == 49;
replace estincome = 350000 if income == 23 & identifier == 40;
replace estincome = 330000 if income == 23 & identifier == 9;
replace estincome = 310000 if income == 23 & identifier == 60;
replace estincome = 290000 if income == 23 & identifier == 41;
replace estincome = 270000 if income == 23 & (identifier == 26
| identifier == 17);
replace estincome = 250000 if income == 23 & (identifier == 8
| identifier == 35);
replace estincome = 230000 if income == 23 & (identifier == 4
| identifier == 46 | identifier == 13);
replace estincome = 210000 if income == 23 & (identifier == 61
| identifier == 57 | identifier == 28);
replace estincome = 190000 if income == 23 & (identifier == 27
| identifier == 31 | identifier == 25 | identifier == 42);
replace estincome = 170000 if income == 23 & (identifier == 47
| identifier == 52 | identifier == 44 | identifier == 36
| identifier == 62 | identifier == 62 | identifier == 48);
replace estincome = 150000 if income == 23 & (identifier == 53
| identifier == 30 | identifier == 29 | identifier == 55
| identifier == 21 | identifier == 45 | identifier == 23
| identifier == 43 | identifier == 2);
replace estincome = 130000 if income == 23 & (identifier == 14
| identifier == 5 | identifier == 24 | identifier == 50
| identifier == 1 | identifier == 32 | identifier == 15
| identifier == 6 | identifier == 3 | identifier == 58
| identifier == 16 | identifier == 34 | identifier == 12);
replace estincome = 120000 if income == 23 & (identifier == 18
| identifier == 59 | identifier == 22 | identifier == 20
| identifier == 54 | identifier == 51 | identifier == 39
| identifier == 37 | identifier == 19);
drop identifier;
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replace estincome2 = estincome if income == 23;
***Building a better gini;
***lower bound income gini;
sort neighborhood estincome;
by neighborhood: gen identifier = _n;
by neighborhood: egen sampsize = max(identifier);
by neighborhood: gen ci = sum(estincome);
by neighborhood: egen totinc = sum(estincome);
gen cumpop = identifier/sampsize;
gen cuminc = ci/totinc;
by neighborhood: gen X = cumpop[identifier+1]-cumpop;
by neighborhood: gen Y = cuminc[identifier+1] + cuminc;
gen XY = X*Y;
by neighborhood: egen secterm = sum(XY);
gen incomegini_l = abs(1-secterm);
drop XY X Y secterm cumpop cuminc ci identifier totinc sampsize ;
***Upper bound income gini;
sort neighborhood estincome2;
by neighborhood: gen identifier = _n;
by neighborhood: egen sampsize = max(identifier);
by neighborhood: gen ci = sum(estincome2);
by neighborhood: egen totinc = sum(estincome2);
gen cumpop = identifier/sampsize;
gen cuminc = ci/totinc;
by neighborhood: gen X = cumpop[identifier+1]-cumpop;
by neighborhood: gen Y = cuminc[identifier+1] + cuminc;
gen XY = X*Y;
by neighborhood: egen secterm = sum(XY);
gen incomegini_u = abs(1-secterm);
drop XY X Y secterm cumpop cuminc ci identifier totinc sampsize;
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******************Ed Gini******************************;
gen edyrs = 0;
replace edyrs = 8 if educ == 2;
replace edyrs = 12 if educ == 3;
replace edyrs = 14 if educ == 4 | educ == 5 | educ == 7;
replace edyrs = 16 if educ == 6;
replace edyrs = 18 if educ == 8;
replace edyrs = 22 if educ == 9 | educ == 10;
sort neighborhood edyrs;
by neighborhood: egen mu = mean(edyrs);
by neighborhood: gen identifier = _n;
by neighborhood: egen samplesize = max(identifier);
by neighborhood: egen p2 = max(identifier) if edyrs == 8;
by neighborhood: egen p3 = max(identifier) if edyrs == 12;
by neighborhood: egen p4 = max(identifier) if edyrs == 14;
by neighborhood: egen p5 = max(identifier) if edyrs == 16;
by neighborhood: egen p6 = max(identifier) if edyrs == 18;
by neighborhood: egen p7 = max(identifier) if edyrs == 22;
by neighborhood: egen cp2 = count(p2);
by neighborhood: egen cp3 = count(p3);
by neighborhood: egen cp4 = count(p4);
by neighborhood: egen cp5 = count(p5);
by neighborhood: egen cp6 = count(p6);
by neighborhood: egen cp7 = count(p7);
by neighborhood: gen p_2 = cp2 / samplesize;
by neighborhood: gen p_3 = cp3 / samplesize;
by neighborhood: gen p_4 = cp4 / samplesize;
by neighborhood: gen p_5 = cp5 / samplesize;
by neighborhood: gen p_6 = cp6 / samplesize;
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by neighborhood: gen p_7 = cp7 / samplesize;
gen y_2 = 8;
gen y_3 = 12;
gen y_4 = 14;
gen y_5 = 16;
gen y_6 = 18;
gen y_7 = 22;
by neighborhood: gen sensitivity = (samplesize/(samplesize - 1));
gen edgini = sensitivity * ((1 / mu) * ((p_3 * (y_3 - y_2) * p_2) +
(p_4 * (y_4 - y_2) * p_2)
+ (p_4 * (y_4 - y_3) * p_3) + (p_5 * (y_5 - y_2) * p_2) +
(p_5 * (y_5 - y_3) * p_3) + (p_5 * (y_5 - y_4) * p_4) +
(p_6 * (p_6 - y_2) * p_2)+ (p_6 * (y_6 - y_3) * p_3) +
(p_6 * (y_6 - y_4) * p_4) + (p_6 * (y_6 - y_5) * p_5) +
(p_7 * (y_7 - y_2) * p_2) + (p_7 * (y_7 - y_3) * p_3) +
(p_7 * (y_7 - y_4) * p_4)+ (p_7 * (y_7 - y_5) * p_5) +
(p_7 * (y_7 - y_6) * p_6)));
drop sensitivity samplesize mu y_* p_* p* identifier cp*;
****Thiel index for education (alpha = 1)*************;
sort neighborhood;
by neighborhood: gen identifier = _n;
by neighborhood: egen samplesize = max(identifier);
by neighborhood: egen mu = mean(edyrs);
gen inner = (edyrs/mu)*ln(edyrs/mu);
by neighborhood: egen sum = sum(inner);
gen edthiel = 10*(sum/samplesize);
drop mu identifier inner sum;
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*******Thiel index for income (alpha = 1)***********;
by neighborhood: egen mu = mean(estincome);
gen inner = (estincome/mu)*ln(estincome/mu);
by neighborhood: egen sum = sum(inner);
gen thielincome = (sum/samplesize);
drop mu inner sum;
***************************************************;
****************************************************;
sort neighborhood;
by neighborhood: egen mi = mean(estincome);
replace meaninc = mi;
drop mi;
by neighborhood: egen medianinc = median(estincome);
by neighborhood: egen maxinc = max(estincome);
sort neighborhood;
by neighborhood: egen me = mean(edyrs);
replace meaned = me;
drop me;
by neighborhood: egen mededyrs = median(edyrs);
by neighborhood: egen maxedyrs = max(edyrs);
**************************************************;
***************Neighborhood Difference Terms;
sort neighborhood;
by neighborhood: egen memberinc = mean(estincome) if multipart == 2;
by neighborhood: egen mi = max(memberinc);
replace memberinc = mi if memberinc == .;
by neighborhood: egen memberedyrs = mean(edyrs) if multipart == 2;
by neighborhood: egen me = max(memberedyrs);
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replace memberedyrs = me if memberedyrs == .;
drop mi me;
***uses the mean;
gen incomedif1 = abs(estincome - meaninc);
gen educdif1 = abs(edyrs - meaned);
***uses the median;
gen incomedif2 = abs(estincome - medinc);
gen educdif2 = abs(edyrs - mededyrs);
***uses the max;
gen incomedif3 = abs(estincome - maxinc);
gen educdif3 = abs(edyrs - mededyrs);
***uses the average of people who participate;
gen incomedif4 = abs(estincome - memberinc);
gen educdif4 = abs(edyrs - memberedyrs);
***********************(Multinomial Logit)*************************;
gen multipart = 0;
replace multipart = 1 if ((ccmcat == 1 | cctranscript ==1 )
& ccinperson == 0)| ((cbmcat == 1 | cbtranscript == 1)
& cbinperson == 0) | (htranscript == 1 & hinperson == 0)
| contact == 1 | editor == 1
| ((ncmcat == 1 | nctranscript == 1) & ncinperson == 0);
replace multipart = 2 if (ccinperson == 1 | cbinperson == 1
| hinperson == 1 | ncinperson == 1 | othermeeting == 1);
*replace multipart = 3 if ((ccinperson == 1 & ccmcat == 0
& cctranscript == 0) | (cbinperson == 1 & cbmcat == 0
& cbtranscript == 0) | (hinperson == 1 & htranscript ==0)
| (ncinperson == 1 & ncmcat == 0 & nctranscript == 0)
| othermeeting == 1);
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***********************************************************;
sum resyrs own female married age household estincome edyrs
educ incomegini_l incomegini_u edgini if multipart == 0;
sum resyrs own female married age household estincome edyrs
educ incomegini_l incomegini_u edgini if multipart == 1;
sum resyrs own female married age household estincome edyrs
educ incomegini_l incomegini_u edgini if multipart == 2;
***********************************************************;
***Education gini;
qui mlogit multipart female age sqage own resyrs working married
household children edyrs student lowinc highinc edgini
meanhousehold meaned meaninc neighborhoodsize
[pweight = 1/prob], cluster(neighborhood) robust;
margeff, replace;
esto;
***Education Theil;
qui mlogit multipart female age sqage own resyrs working married
household children edyrs student lowinc highinc edthiel
meanhousehold meaned meaninc neighborhoodsize
[pweight = 1/prob], cluster(neighborhood) robust;
margeff, replace;
esto;
esta * using tester.tex, se unstack replace;
esto clear;
***Income gini;
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qui mlogit multipart female age sqage own resyrs working married
household children edyrs student lowinc highinc incomegini_l
meanhousehold meaned meaninc neighborhoodsize
[pweight = 1/prob], cluster(neighborhood) robust;
margeff, replace;
esto;
qui mlogit multipart female age sqage own resyrs working married
household children edyrs student lowinc highinc incomegini_u
meanhousehold meaned meaninc neighborhoodsize
[pweight = 1/prob], cluster(neighborhood) robust;
margeff, replace;
esto;
***Education Theil;
qui mlogit multipart female age sqage own resyrs working married
household children edyrs student lowinc highinc thielinc
meanhousehold meaned meaninc neighborhoodsize
[pweight = 1/prob], cluster(neighborhood) robust;
margeff, replace;
esto;
esta * using incomeresults.tex, se unstack replace;
esto clear;
***Difference (from Neighborhood Mean);
mlogit multipart female age sqage own resyrs working married
household children edyrs student lowinc highinc incomedif1
meaninc meaned meanhousehold neighborhoodsize;
mlogtest, all;
fitstat;
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qui mlogit multipart female age sqage own resyrs working married
household children edyrs student lowinc highinc incomedif1
meaninc meaned meanhousehold neighborhoodsize
[pweight = 1/prob], cluster(neighborhood);
esto m1coef;
qui margeff;
esto m1mfx;
mlogit multipart female age sqage own resyrs working married household
children edyrs student lowinc highinc educdif1 meaninc meaned
meanhousehold neighborhoodsize;
mlogtest, all;
fitstat;
qui mlogit multipart female age sqage own resyrs working married household
children edyrs student lowinc highinc educdif1 meaninc meaned
meanhousehold neighborhoodsize [pweight = 1/prob],
cluster(neighborhood);
esto m2coef;
qui margeff;
esto m2mfx;
esta m1coef m2coef using dif1coef.tex, se unstack scalars(r2_p) replace;
esta m1mfx m2mfx using dif1mfx.tex, se unstack scalars(r2_p) replace;
esto clear;
***Difference (from Neighborhood Median);
mlogit multipart female age sqage own resyrs working married household
children edyrs student lowinc highinc incomedif2 meaninc meaned
meanhousehold neighborhoodsize;
mlogtest, all;
fitstat;
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qui mlogit multipart female age sqage own resyrs working married household
children edyrs student lowinc highinc incomedif2 meaninc meaned
meanhousehold neighborhoodsize [pweight = 1/prob],
cluster(neighborhood);
esto m3coef;
qui margeff;
esto m3mfx;
mlogit multipart female age sqage own resyrs working married household
children edyrs student lowinc highinc educdif2 meaninc meaned
meanhousehold neighborhoodsize;
mlogtest, all;
fitstat;
qui mlogit multipart female age sqage own resyrs working married household
children edyrs student lowinc highinc educdif2 meaninc meaned
meanhousehold neighborhoodsize [pweight = 1/prob],
cluster(neighborhood);
esto m4coef;
qui margeff;
esto m4mfx;
esta m3coef m4coef using dif2coef.tex, se unstack scalars(r2_p) replace;
esta m3mfx m4mfx using dif2mfx.tex, se unstack scalars(r2_p) replace;
esto clear;
***Difference (from Neighborhood Max);
mlogit multipart female age sqage own resyrs working married household
children edyrs student lowinc highinc incomedif3 meaninc
meaned meanhousehold neighborhoodsize;
mlogtest, all;
fitstat;
qui mlogit multipart female age sqage own resyrs working married
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household children edyrs student lowinc highinc incomedif3
meaninc meaned meanhousehold neighborhoodsize
[pweight = 1/prob], cluster(neighborhood);
esto m5coef;
qui margeff;
esto m5mfx;
mlogit multipart female age sqage own resyrs working married household
children edyrs student lowinc highinc educdif3 meaninc meaned
meanhousehold neighborhoodsize;
mlogtest, all;
fitstat;
qui mlogit multipart female age sqage own resyrs working married household
children edyrs student lowinc highinc educdif3 meaninc meaned
meanhousehold neighborhoodsize [pweight = 1/prob],
cluster(neighborhood);
esto m6coef;
qui margeff;
esto m6mfx;
esta m5coef m6coef using dif3coef.tex, se unstack scalars(r2_p) replace;
esta m5mfx m6mfx using dif3mfx.tex, se unstack scalars(r2_p) replace;
esto clear;
***Difference (from average neighborhood participant);
mlogit multipart female age sqage own resyrs working married household
children edyrs student lowinc highinc incomedif4 meaninc meaned
meanhousehold neighborhoodsize;
mlogtest, all;
fitstat;
qui mlogit multipart female age sqage own resyrs working married household
children edyrs student lowinc highinc incomedif4 meaninc meaned
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meanhousehold neighborhoodsize [pweight = 1/prob],
cluster(neighborhood);
esto m7coef;
qui margeff;
esto m7mfx;
mlogit multipart female age sqage own resyrs working married household
children edyrs student lowinc highinc educdif4 meaninc meaned
meanhousehold neighborhoodsize;
mlogtest, all;
fitstat;
qui mlogit multipart female age sqage own resyrs working married household
children edyrs student lowinc highinc educdif4 meaninc meaned
meanhousehold neighborhoodsize [pweight = 1/prob],
cluster(neighborhood);
esto m8coef;
qui margeff;
esto m8mfx;
esta m7coef m8coef using dif4coef.tex, se unstack scalars(r2_p) replace;
esta m7mfx m8mfx using dif4mfx.tex, se unstack scalars(r2_p) replace;
esto clear;
sort neighborhood;
by neighborhood: egen avepart = mean(multipart);
by neighborhood: egen solo = count(multipart) if multipart == 1;
by neighborhood: egen m = max(solo);
by neighborhood: replace solo = m if solo == .;
drop m;
gen avesolo = solo / samplesize;
by neighborhood: egen face2face = count(multipart) if multipart == 2;
APPENDIX D. STATA CODE 111
by neighborhood: egen m = max(face2face);
by neighborhood: replace face2face = m if face2face == .;
drop m;
gen aveinperson = face2face / samplesize;
by neighborhood: egen none = count(multipart) if multipart == 0;
by neighborhood: egen m = max(none);
by neighborhood: replace none = m if none == .;
drop m;
gen avenopart = none / samplesize;
scatter avenopart incomegini_l, title(Non-participants)
subtitle(and income inequality)
xtitle(Lower-bound income Gini)
ytitle(Proportion of neighborhood that never participates);
graph2tex, epsfile(lgini0);
scatter avenopart incomegini_u, title(Non-participants)
subtitle(and income inequality)
xtitle(Upper-bound income Gini)
ytitle(Proportion of neighborhood that never participates);
graph2tex, epsfile(ugini0);
scatter avenopart thielincome, title(Non-participants)
subtitle(and income inequality)
xtitle(Thiel index on income)
ytitle(Proportion of neighborhood that never participates);
graph2tex, epsfile(thiel0);
scatter avenopart edgini, title(Non-participants)
subtitle(and education inequality)
xtitle(Education Gini)
ytitle(Proportion of neighborhood that never participates);
graph2tex, epsfile(edgini0);
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scatter avenopart edthiel, title(Non-participants)
subtitle(and education inequality)
xtitle(Thiel index on education)
ytitle(Proportion of neighborhood that never participates);
graph2tex, epsfile(edthiel0);
scatter avesolo incomegini_l, title(Participating alone)
subtitle(and income inequality)
xtitle(Lower-bound income Gini)
ytitle(Proportion of neighborhood that participates alone);
graph2tex, epsfile(lgini1);
scatter avesolo incomegini_u, title(Participating alone)
subtitle(and income inequality)
xtitle(Upper-bound income Gini)
ytitle(Proportion of neighborhood that participates alone);
graph2tex, epsfile(ugini1);
scatter avesolo thielincome, title(Participating alone)
subtitle(and income inequality)
xtitle(Thiel index on income)
ytitle(Proportion of neighborhood that participates alone);
graph2tex, epsfile(thiel1);
scatter avesolo edgini, title(Participating alone)
subtitle(and education inequality)
xtitle(Education Gini)
ytitle(Proportion of neighborhood that participates alone);
graph2tex, epsfile(edgini1);
scatter avesolo edthiel, title(Participating in person)
subtitle(and education inequality)
xtitle(Thiel index on education)
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ytitle(Proportion of neighborhood that participates in person);
graph2tex, epsfile(edthiel1);
scatter aveinperson incomegini_l, title(Participating in person)
subtitle(and income inequality)
xtitle(Lower-bound income Gini)
ytitle(Proportion of neighborhood that participates in person);
graph2tex, epsfile(lgini2);
scatter aveinperson incomegini_u, title(Participating in person)
subtitle(and income inequality)
xtitle(Upper-bound income Gini)
ytitle(Proportion of neighborhood that participates in person);
graph2tex, epsfile(ugini2);
scatter aveinperson thielincome, title(Participating in person)
subtitle(and income inequality)
xtitle(Thiel index on income)
ytitle(Proportion of neighborhood that participates in person);
graph2tex, epsfile(thiel2);
scatter aveinperson edgini, title(Participating in person)
subtitle(and education inequality)
xtitle(Education Gini)
ytitle(Proportion of neighborhood that participates in person);
graph2tex, epsfile(edgini2);
scatter aveinperson edthiel, title(Participating in person)
subtitle(and education inequality)
xtitle(Thiel index on education)
ytitle(Proportion of neighborhood that participates in person);
graph2tex, epsfile(edthiel1);
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